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This thesis looks at six key members of the Paris-based,
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Exports (COCOM) , as
well as the Soviet methods of acquiring Western technology.
The Soviet acquisition of Western technology is a pressing
concern for the Western world and will continue to grow. In
analyzing the shortcomings of COCOM and the policy making
process in West Germany, Great Britain, United States,
France, Italy, and Japan, various propositions are
identified which explain the flow of technology moving east.
Critical variables include: the informal nature of COCOM
itself, each country's commercial orientation, the lack of
national security input when conducting export transactions,
the specific country's political will and technological
proficiency, the amount of trade the specific country does
with the Soviet bloc in conjunction with their export
process, laws and sanctions against violators, as well as
their participation within COCOM. Policy remedies based on
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I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN
A. INTRODUCTION
During my first few months at the Naval Postgraduate
School, while discussing the U.S. maritime strategy in one
of my classes, the topic of resupplying Europe and Japan
came up in class. At this same time, it had just been
discovered that Toshiba Marine, a subsidiary of the Toshiba
Corporation, had sold computerized milling machines to the
Soviet Union. This sale was causing quite a stir within
Congress and was receiving wide publicity throughout the
entire media. In class, it was brought up that in event of
war with the Soviet Union, NATO and Japanese forces would
only be able to hold out for so long, before they would have
to be reinforced and resupplied from the United States and
Canada. Knowing that certain immediate personnel and
logistic support could be airlifted to their specific areas
of responsibility brought little relief in my mind, when
realizing that the bulk of these reinforcements would have
to move to Europe and Japan by sea. The fact that our
allies (in this case Japan and Norway) gave the Soviet Union
the improved capability of interdicting this effort, by
selling them computerized milling machines which will make
the Soviet submarine force an even more potent threat,
inspired me to find out why.
In looking into this unauthorized sale of strategic
technology, I came across an organization that I had never
heard of before, "COCOM." I discovered that this acronym
stood for the "Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Exports." Later I found out that this organization, which
is made up of NATO, minus Iceland, plus Japan, is the only
multilateral organization in the Western alliance which
coordinates the flow of strategic technology to the Soviet
Union.
After learning about this organization and its
tremendous responsibilities, I started asking myself a few
more questions. Why was it that I have never heard of this
committee before? I knew about NATO and even learned about
the U.S ./Japanese security treaty, but I had never heard of
COCOM. After looking further into the Toshiba Incident, I
started coming up with more questions. Why did these two
countries (Norway and Japan) , who are members of this
organization, violate COCOM' s rules? Why didn't COCOM lay
sanctions on these two countries for violating the rules?
Why would any country in this organization want to violate
these rules, anyway? Why didn't any senior naval, or in the
case of Japan, Maritime Self-Defense Force Admirals, warn
their respective countries of the consequences of this
transaction? In an attempt to answer these questions, I
became immersed in the technology transfer argument, which
motivated me to write this thesis.
B. PROBLEM
The Soviet acquisition of Western technology is one of
the most pressing concerns to the national security of the
Western world. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral
Export Controls (COCOM) is the international organization
responsible for regulating the technology flow to the Soviet
Bloc. This informal organization, which is strictly
voluntary and has no charter, has undergone numerous changes
since its inception just prior to World War II. This
organization was initiated by the United States, and the
United States has been the driving force behind export
controls, since the establishment of COCOM. However, the
control of exports was much easier in the late '40s and
early 50s, because the United States was in possession of
most of the new technological developments. As technology
proliferates so does the problem of controlling strategic
technology to the Soviet Bloc.
COCOM is made up of NATO, minus Iceland plus Japan.
Each country is responsible for regulating and controlling
their own exports. Among the membership of COCOM these
controls vary in severity and effectiveness from fairly
substantial in the United States, to none at all in Spain,
Portugal, Turkey, etc. This needs to be put in proper
prospective though, because most countries at the low end of
the spectrum are not very technologically proficient.
However, countries at the high end of the spectrum are
substantially proficient in various technologies, and their
ability to control exports and impose sanctions on violators
has a direct effect on national security of the Western
world.
The Soviet Union maintains a huge network to exploit the
various weaknesses in these national systems that contain
the technologies they seek. The Soviet Union, unable to
develop certain technologies on their own, maintain this
network to acquire needed innovations both through legal and
illegal means in order to save billions of dollars and
contribute to their military industrial complex.
No country is totally immune from this extensive Soviet
effort, but some countries resist better than others.
Taking into account technological prowess, industrial base,
export processes and controls, enforcement, amount of trade
with the Soviet Bloc, history of export violations, number
of submissions to COCOM and opinions of individuals who work
within the export control process, one can identify the weak
links in the system. Taking the above mentioned indicators
into account, West Germany and Japan presently pose the
greatest threat of diverting strategic technology to the
Soviet Union.
The implications of this situation are most significant
for the United States. The United States maintains the bulk
of the initiative against the Soviet threat, allowing the
allies to vigorously pursue strictly economic objectives.
The situation gets even further complicated as technology
proliferates outside of the COCOM membership. Unless a
national security perspective or opinion can be added to the
economic concerns in these countries doing business with the
Soviet Union, technology will continue to find its way east.
Without a common standard, one that is strictly and evenly
enforced among the membership of COCOM, the United States is
at a disadvantage.
C. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The problem of technology transfer became very public
throughout the mid-1980s. With the revelation of the
Toshiba incident and later the West German involvement with
the Libyan chemical plant, almost all newspapers wrote
numerous articles and opinions on these or related topics.
Using mostly, but not exclusively, the New York Times
,
Washington Post , and the Christian Science Monitor's
coverage of the Toshiba and other related technology
security incidents, I developed an accurate description of
this phenomenon.
In seeking an explanation for these technology transfers
and their policy implications, I read many professional
publications and policy papers that I used extensively
throughout this thesis. The RAND Corporation, Department of
Defense, CIA, FBIS, are just a few of the key organizations
that write frequently on East-West trade and technology
transfer. The importance of the topic has also prompted the
publication of very useful books. 1
Extensive interviews were conducted with U.S. government
officials with significant experience in the area of
technology transfer. From these interviews, I learned of
the day to day realities of how the system works, a critical
supplement to written sources on the subject. These
interviews were key in helping me identify the strengths and
weaknesses in the system. Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, former
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, and former Director,
Defense Technology and Security Administration; Mr. Michael
Maloof, Director, Technology Security Operations, Defense
Technology and Security Agency; and Mr. Dan Hoydysh,
Director, Office of Technology and Policy Analysis,
Department of Commerce, were a few of the individuals
interviewed.
D. PROPOSITIONS
In researching this topic and attempting to identify why
some countries leak more than others, one can develop
various propositions which explain the flow of technology to
1. The two most recently published books that best
explain the magnitude of the problem today are Selling the
Rope to Hang Capitalism and The New Wizard War . Some of the
books I used to document the history of export controls, and
the interaction between the Soviet Union and the member
nations of COCOM are: Technology Control, Competition, and
National Security; Conflict and Consensus ; National
Security and Technology Transfer: Strategic Dimensions of
East-West Trade ; Siberia and the Soviet Far East . (See
Bibliography.
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the east. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the level
of sensitive technology being transmitted to the Soviet bloc
is a function of:
1. The informal nature of COCOM itself.
2. The biggest leakers having a much more commercial
orientation than other countries.
3. A total lack of any national security/military
perspective, input or opinion when making export
transaction decisions.
4. The specific country's political will and perception
of the threat.
5. A country's technological proficiency and industrial
base.
6. The amount of trade the specific country does with the
Soviet bloc.
7. The specific country's export process, laws, and
sanctions against violators.
8. The specific country's participation in COCOM and
history of export violations.
Research based on these propositions will reveal the
magnitude and causes of technology leaking to the Warsaw
Pact countries. Six countries—the United States, Great
Britain, West Germany, Japan, Italy and France—will be
examined in depth. The variation in technology transfer
controls and leakage will be explained and policy remedies
suggested.
II. BACKGROUND ON COCOM
A. THE EVOLUTION OF EXPORT CONTROLS AND COCOM
The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM) is the informal multilateral organization
through which the United States and its allies attempt to
coordinate the national controls they apply over the export
of strategic materials and technology to the Communist
world. The origins of export controls, which later led to
the formation of COCOM, can be traced back to 1948. The
U.S. Department of Commerce placed mandatory or "validated"
licensing controls on most exports to the Communist bloc
shortly after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia. In
general, every American export, except those to Canada,
required some type of export license. These were broad
authorizations that led to the most formidable and
perplexing problem of commodity identification and
classification. It was obvious that not every commodity was
of strategic significance and warranted imposing
restrictions on its export to the Soviet bloc. To address
this and related problems, the United States initiated the
export control bureaucracy which exists today.
The first piece of legislation adopted by Congress over
the administration of exports was the Export Control Act of
1949. This was a compromise between the executive branch
and Congress in the regulation of exports as they pertained
to national security and in fulfilling our international
responsibilities to Marshall Plan participants. It was
during this time that the initial bureaucracy was formed to
compile lists of applicable items. These lists identified
goods of various degrees of strategic importance, and it is
these original lists that have been renewed periodically
ever since. The Export Control Act of 1949 initiated the
major policy guidance, administration and enforcement
machinery governing export controls as they exist today in
the United States, as well as within COCOM.
On September 27, 1950, Congress passed the Cannon
Amendment, which required the United States to terminate all
economic and financial assistance to any country whose trade
with the Soviet Union was found by the National Security
Council to be "contrary to the security interests of the
United States." 1 The amendment was applicable only during
periods when the Armed Forces of the United States were
actively engaged in hostilities while carrying out a
decision of the United Nations Security Council (i.e.,
Korea) .
The Cannon Amendment reflected growing congressional
concern over the lack of uniformity in export control
between the United States and its allies in Western Europe,
1. Nathaniel McKitterick, East-West Trade: The
Background of U.S. Policy , New York: Twentieth Century Fund,
Inc. , 1966, p. 12
.
all of them at the time being recipients of Marshall Plan
aid. This amendment's immediate issue was trade with
Communist China; the British had recognized the Peking
regime before the Korean War and trade between Britain and
China contained some goods embargoed by the United States.
It was evident that controls on East-West trade were less
stringent in Western Europe than in the United States, a
pattern which still exists today.
Early in 1949 the British and the French had drawn up a
joint list of strategic items similar to, but less
comprehensive than, the currently existing U.S. lists. They
tried to use their lists as the basis for a series of
bilateral agreements with all Marshall Plan countries,
including the United States. However, it was soon evident
that a multilateral negotiation would be more suitable. In
November of 1949 a joint "Consultative Group" was
established in Paris which included the nations of NATO
(minus Iceland) and Japan. The day to day work of the
Consultative Group was delegated to two sub-groups, the
Coordinating Committee (COCOM) , which began functioning in
January 1950, and the China Committee (CHINCOM) , which was
not established until September 1952 when Japan joined the
group. The working groups have been adding to and
subtracting from agreed international lists of "strategic"
items ever since. The two committees were merged in 1957,
with only COCOM surviving. The whole exercise was and still
10
is completely voluntary, and the rule of unanimity prevails.
In short, the "international lists" represented from the
beginning, and still represent, the lowest common
denominator of agreement upon East-West trade controls which
exists in the Free World alliance. 2
Because it is an informal and voluntary organization,
COCOM has no power for enforcement. It is based neither on
treaty nor executive agreement. Its members have no legal
obligation to participate in its deliberations or to be
bound by its recommendations and decisions. Furthermore,
its operations have from the outset been highly confidential
and its activities, at least in Europe, attract little or no
publicity. It has been suggested that if this were not the
case, some non-U. S. members might be forced to withdraw from
COCOM, either because of internal domestic pressures or the
incompatibility of individual country domestic laws with its
controls. 3
Legislation like the Export Control Act of 1949 and
later the Battle Act in 1951 attempted to use U.S. aid as a
lever to compel allied compliance on export controls. It
was this enormous economic force that initially brought
COCOM into being and held it together in the aftermath of
2. McKitterick, East-West Trade: The Background of
U.S. Policy , p. 13.
3. United States Congress, Office of Technology
Assessment, Technology and East-West Trade . New Jersey,
Allanheld, Osmun & Co., Inc., 1981, p. 154.
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World War II and the early years of the cold war. The
amount of U.S. economic and military aid to Western Europe
began to decline seriously after 1955. As it decreased,
Western European trade with the East began to rise, although
the above legislation provided sanctions to countries who
exported restricted commodities to Communist countries. The
sanctions have never been invoked, but whether this is due
to success in limiting East-West trade, or to high-level
policy decision to avoid sensitive confrontations, is
unclear. In any case, the increasing interdependence of all
COCOM members with the East at economic, political, and
diplomatic levels has eliminated whatever leverage that
actually existed. However, the United States is still the
driving force in upgrading COCOM 's strength and it is
generally perceived in both Europe and Japan that COCOM is a
useful institution in limiting strategic technology to the
Soviet Union.
B. THE COCOM LISTS
COCOM maintains three lists of embargoed goods to the
Soviet bloc: (1) the munitions list that includes all
military items, (2) the atomic energy list, including
sources of fissionable material and their components, and
(3) the industrial/commercial or dual use list. Each COCOM
country maintains its own national export control lists in
addition to multilateral lists. Only the United States has
12
national lists which are more restrictive than those of
COCOM. 4
By their very nature, munitions and nuclear materials
have clear military purposes and strategic importance, and
there is generally little debate over the wisdom of
restricting their sale. The industrial list, on the other
hand, contains those dual-use items (e.g.
,
jet engines, air
traffic control eguipment, computers) that, although
nominally civilian, have military potential. It is this
dual use technology that produces the varying attitudes in
Western European countries toward East-West trade. The
technological content of these dual-use items in the
industrial list is usually high.
The industrial list is subdivided into three categories:
International List 1 (embargoed items) ; International List 2
(guantitatively controlled items) ; and International List 3
(exchange of information and surveillance items) . List 1
contains those items that member nations agree not to sell
to the Communist bloc unless permission is specifically
granted after a request for an exception. List 2 contains
items that may be exported, but only in specified
quantities. Licenses to export more than the quantity
specified for a given item, requires special exceptions.
List 3 contains items that may be sold, but over which the
4. Angela S. Yergin, East-West Technology Transfer:
European Perspectives , Beverly Hills: Sage Publications,
Inc. , 1980, p. 10.
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exporting nation must maintain surveillance of end use.
This information as well as documentation of the sale must
be reported to COCOM. 5
Most of the dual-use items that pose the greatest
problems for export controls are contained in List 1, which
is divided into ten individual groupings. These conform
closely to those on the U.S. Commodity Control List (CCL)
:
1. metalworking machinery.
2. chemical and petroleum equipment.
3. electrical and power-generating equipment.
4. general industrial equipment.
5. transportation equipment.
6. electronic and precision instruments.
7. metals, minerals, and their manufacture.
8. chemicals and metalloids.
9. petroleum products.
10. rubber and rubber products.
The COCOM list itself is not public information, but it
is virtually identical to the national lists of controlled
items published by some COCOM members. Furthermore, the
American CCL distinguishes between multilaterally and
unilaterally controlled items, and the content of the COCOM
5. Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and
East-West Trade , p. 155.
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industrial list can be inferred simply by subtracting the
former from the latter. 6
At the outset, COCOM controls, at least as measured by
the number of items on the lists, were quite stringent,
although never as restrictive as U.S. unilateral controls.
Debate among and within member countries on the relative
weight that should be given to security concerns and trade
advantages has been continuous. In order to accommodate
this debate and to keep lists current, periodic list reviews
for purposes of deletion, addition and amendment are
undertaken at periodic intervals. No details of the
decisions made in these reviews or the debates surrounding
them are ever published. However, a comparison of U.S. and
other national lists indicates that the overall trend in
COCOM has been toward liberalization of controls. 7
C. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES
Western European countries, given their varying
attitudes toward East-West trade and technology transfer,
have also differed in their assessment of the value of
COCOM. COCOM worked fairly well in the 50' s but the most
documented strain on the organization was the 1962-63 NATO
steel pipe embargo. In November 1962, the United States
6. Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and
East-West Trade , p. 156.
7. Office of Technology Assessment, Technology and
East-West Trade , p. 156.
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tried to prevent its allies from exporting large diameter
steel pipe to the Soviet bloc to impede the completion of
the Friendship oil pipeline from the USSR to Eastern Europe.
The pipe embargo order was passed in NATO because the United
States knew that the British would not agree to it in COCOM,
and COCOM regulations require unanimity. Several noteworthy
points emerged from this attempt to prevent a technology
transfer. Washington was able to prevail upon West Germany
to force several German corporations to cancel already
concluded deals for the sale of pipe, causing an outcry in
the business community. Since the United States did not
have as much political leverage over its other NATO allies
as it did over West Germany, it was unable to prevent
Britain, Italy or Japan from selling similar steel pipe to
the Soviets. Ultimately, not only did the Soviet Union find
alternative sources of supply for pipe, but the embargo
induced it to step up the development of its own pipe making
capacity. The completion of the Friendship pipeline was
delayed by only a year as a result of the embargo.
Moveover, there was strong suspicion in most European
capitals that the real American motivation for the embargo
was not fear of enhancing Soviet military capabilities, but
rather, fear on the part of U.S. oil companies that the
Soviets would dump cheap oil on the Western European market.
Whatever the truth of this perception, the net result was
that it created an atmosphere of mistrust in U.S. -West
16
European relations and it had only a marginal effect on the
completion of the pipeline, which among other things,
supplied Red Army troops in Eastern Europe. 8
The pipe embargo has not been forgotten in Western
Europe and the issues it raised remain important to the
perceptions of Western Europeans of the utility of export
controls and of the U.S. role in them. The basic themes
that recur are the suspected hypocrisy of the United States,
its overzealousness in enforcing stricter controls than
necessary, and the basic ineffectiveness of such controls in
preventing the acguisition of technology or technical
capacity in the Communist bloc.
D. DOMESTIC PRESSURES
It also needs to be noted that the debate over export
controls is not unigue to just multilateral restrictions
within the members of COCOM. There is constant heated
debate within the U.S. over our own self-induced export
controls. The United States' unilateral technology controls
affect U.S. trade performance it two ways: directly, as a
result of the loss of sales when a license is denied; and
indirectly, by discouraging future sales when the
uncertainties inherent in the licensing process creates the
belief among foreign countries that U.S. companies are
unpredictable and unreliable suppliers. The issue is not
8. Yergin, East-West Technology Transfer; European
Perspectives , p. 12.
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only national security, but also the use of export sanctions
to achieve foreign policy goals, which are sometimes
achieved to the detriment of individual corporate losses of
both image and finances. Most examples of the direct effect
of export controls, resulting from loss of sales, have been
the result of foreign policy controls rather than strategic
goods and technology controls. The most celebrated example
is the graduated series of foreign policy controls
associated with another Soviet natural gas pipeline similar
to the one spoken about earlier. Controls were first placed
on the export of oil and gas exploration or production
equipment and technology to the Soviet Union in response to
Soviet actions considered damaging to U.S. foreign policy
interests. Validated licensing requirements for energy-
related equipment and technology were increased in 1978 in
response to human rights concerns relating to the
Shcharansky trial. Responding to the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, significant new controls were imposed in 1979.
These restrictions were increased in 1981 following the
suppression of civil rights in Poland. 9
Among the U.S. companies affected by these control
measures, was the construction equipment manufacturer,
Caterpillar. This U.S. firm and Komatsu of Japan are the
9. James P. Moore, Jr., "A Commerce Department
Perspective on Export Controls," in: Bernard L. Seward Jr.,
Technology Control, Competition. and National Security:
Conflict and Consensus
. New York: University Press of
America, Inc., p. 33.
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only major producers of pipelaying machinery. During the
period between 1981 and 1983, before the restrictive
controls were rescinded, Komatsu completed sales of
approximately $500 million to the Soviet Union for
pipelaying machinery. Needless to say, Caterpillar made
none. Use of these sanctions for foreign policy pressure is
becoming increasingly ineffective with the growing
availability of alternative suppliers. 10
E. STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY APPROACH
Although the debate over export controls and how they
should be conducted rages on in this country as well as in
COCOM, there is still a general consensus that it is a
useful organization. Most all COCOM nations agree that the
West must attempt to coordinate their East-West technology
transfer policies, particularly with regard to strategic
goods, so as not to enhance Soviet military capabilities.
Although both West Germany and the United Kingdom accept the
continued need for COCOM' s existence, there is some
skepticism in these as well as in other countries about the
degree to which it can slow the development of Soviet
technological capacity. In addition, neither West Germany,
Britain nor France accept the U.S. concept of what
constitutes strategic technology. This disagreement about
10. A. Coskun Samli, Technology Transfer: Geographic,
Economic, Cultural, and Technical Dimensions , Westport:
Greenwood Press, Inc., 1985, p. 57.
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definitions of technology was exacerbated by the adoption in
the United States of the "critical technology" approach in
the Export Administration Act of 1979. The critical
technology stems directly from the findings and
recommendations of a report prepared for the Department of
Defense in 1976, An Analysis of Export Control of U.S.
Technology—A POD Perspective , known as the Bucy Report. 1:L
Differentiating between "evolutionary" and
"revolutionary" technology, the Bucy Report recommends
severely restricting the export of design and manufacturing
know-how while lessening export controls on certain
machinery. Export controls should focus on the intrinsic
use of the product, and not on its intended end-use, if the
latter is clearly nonmilitary. The critical technology
approach is predicated on the assumption implicit in the
Bucy Report that "one can select the subset of technologies
of significant military value on which our national military
technology superiority can be presumed to be most
dependent." The Bucy Report assumes that it is possible to
differentiate between technology and equipment, and
recommends more extensive export controls on the former,
while lessening controls on the sale of end products. The
1979 U.S. Export Administration Act includes a provision
clarifying the roles of the Secretary of Commerce and the
11. J. Fred Bucy, Defense Board Task Force on Export
of U.S. Technology, "An Analysis of Export Control of U.S.
Technology: A DOD Perspective," February 197 6.
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Secretary of Defense in maintaining a list of critical goods
and military technologies subject to national security
export controls. Some European countries dispute the
validity of the "critical technology" approach as a means of
establishing criteria for export controls. Although this
concept is embodied in U.S. law, and not in COCOM, it has
become a subject of discussion within the multilateral
forum. 12
It is generally recognized in Europe and the United
States that the COCOM lists are so narrow that they have a
limited effect on East-West trade, but are broad enough to
affect the military capabilities of the Warsaw Pact. The
United States continues to press for the strengthening of
export controls, despite the internal disputes both within
the U.S. as well as in the Western alliance. This never-
ending effort over how best to protect Western military
security while still stimulating economic growth rages on.
Moreover, because COCOM is a voluntary organization and
there are no sanctions against violators (at least published
sanctions) , it is sometimes difficult to enforce compliance,
and suspicions about violations persist. 13
12. Yergin, East-West Technology Transfer; European
Perspectives
, p. 13.




The tensions within COCOM and the differences of opinion
among the allies over East-West technology transfer have
implications affecting all member nations. The
repercussions of this debate have continued to effect
American foreign and economic policies. The latest
legislation, the Export Administration Act Amendments of
1985 (EAAA) , implemented under the Reagan administration, is
a continued effort by the United States for a compromise
between technology control, competition and national
security. This Act along with the reorganization and
increased funding of U.S. control systems, as well as the
increased diplomatic attention by the United States and its
allies to their informal control mechanism COCOM, is the
latest product of the debate. The Export Administration Act
of 1985 and the increased attention to COCOM are the most
recent statements of the United States' dual commitments to
stopping the flow of critical technology to the Soviet bloc
while hopefully increasing U.S. exports to non-Communist
countries.
Under the 1985 provisions, licensing will no longer be
needed for low-level technology commodities going to the
other members of COCOM. Once in place this provision is
expected to reduce the Commerce Department's licensing load
by ten to 15 percent a year. The commodities affected are
those that appear on the COCOM control-list with
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administrative exceptions. Of the 47 commodities with such
provisions, the greatest impact is expected to be in the
area of computers, with its myriad of administrative
exceptions.
The U.S. business community has long expressed its
concern about apparent inequities between U.S. controls and
those of our COCOM allies, which are felt to place U.S.
firms at a competitive disadvantage. Controls on truly
critical items, those of strategic importance, were
maintained on a level consistent with those of other
countries. However, U.S. controls on low-level technology
were considered detrimental to U.S. competitiveness because
such strategically less important items were often available
from West European countries without the same restrictions.
This amendment eliminated that disadvantage. This means
that the U.S. business community will be on a par with our
allies regarding licensing requirements on inter-COCOM
trade.
The favorable treatment accorded our COCOM trading
partners may also be extended to other countries if they
meet the provisions set forth in this amendment. The EAAA
Act mandates that if negotiations with other countries
produce agreements on export restrictions comparable to
those maintained by COCOM, the Commerce Department shall
23
treat exports to these countries in the same manner as it
does exports to members of COCOM. 14
Besides appealing to the Commerce Department, the 1985
EAAA has also benefited the Department of Defense, by
streamlining the government's technology transfer controls
of low technology items that are readily available from
other COCOM countries. This both improves control
effectiveness and minimizes any disruptive effects on
legitimate exports. The DOD has been able to concentrate
their efforts on the increasing Soviet effort to make
illegal diversions. With the U.S. Customs services
"Operation Exodus" and through major cooperative efforts
with our allies in COCOM, attempts at illegal procurement of
technology are being thwarted more effectively.
Not only are these activities more effective, but thanks
to increased automation, the burden on the exporter is being
reduced. The average license processing time has dropped
significantly. The Defense Department's average processing
time has been reduced from approximately 60 days to fewer
than 25. In addition the DOD is working harder with
exporters to find mutually acceptable conditions under which
their products can be licensed. 15
14. Moore, "A Commerce Department Perspective on
Export Control, (I)," p. 37.
15. Talbat S. Lindstom, "A Defense Department
Perspective on Export Controls," in: Bernard L. Seward,
Jr. , Technology Control. Competition, and National Security:
Conflict and Consensus , New York: University Press of
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G. ESTABLISHMENT OF DTSA
In order to focus increased attention and resources on
the review and approval of export licenses, a new
organization was created in May 1985, the Defense Technology
Security Administration (DTSA). 16 DTSA's director is the
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for trade security policy.
The deputy director is designated by the Under Secretary of
Defense for research and engineering and is the Deputy Under
Secretary for international programs and technology. Since
DTSA's primary function is export license review, all DOD
case-processing responsibilities are focused in it, and
significant increases in staffing for DTSA was approved.
This helped DOD meet the new, shortened statutory response
times. 17
H. IMPROVING COCOM
Another major objective of the 1985 EAAA was to increase
the effectiveness of COCOM, not only by streamlining the
export process, but also to improve on a unified allied
response to the Soviet technology acquisition effort. At
the insistence of the Department of Defense, the United
States has always led the effort to improve COCOM. For
America, Inc., p. 48
16. Outreach Directorate, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, Pamphlet, p. 4.
17. Lindstrom, "A Defense Department Perspective on
Export Controls," p. 48.
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reasons previously mentioned COCOM's effectiveness has
lagged behind the vigorous Soviet effort to acquire western
technology. Besides less than enthusiastic support from
some of the member countries, it has lacked modern offices,
adequate staff and secure communication facilities. More
importantly, COCOM had, and still has, no capacity to carry
out independent assessments. It was obvious that unless
COCOM were modernized and given a boost in resources, the
organization could not confront the extensive Soviet
operation to exploit Western technology.
The U.S. has set aside funds to improve COCOM's
operation and has worked through diplomatic channels to
increase COCOM's stature as an organization to a level
commensurate with its important mission. In addition, to
keep up with quickly changing technology, the lists of goods
and technologies COCOM bars from being exported to the
Soviet bloc are now being updated on an ongoing basis. The
United States has proposed that a multilateral military
panel be established to act in an advisory capacity to
COCOM's regular organization, since the organization
currently has no in-house military expertise. There is
growing acceptance of this proposal by the membership. DOD
believes a consensus agreement to implement it is
forthcoming. These initiatives and modernization efforts
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continue to be U.S. sponsored and receive various degrees of
cooperation among the membership of COCOM. 18
I. NON-COCOM COUNTRIES
Because neither the U.S. nor other COCOM members have a
monopoly on high technology, the United States is working
with several non-COCOM, nonaffiliated countries that have
industries producing high-technology goods such as
electronics, fiber optics, and machine tools. These
countries include Israel, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,
Sweden, Switzerland to name a few. The export policies of
these nations, in terms of the foreign availability of
COCOM-controlled items, have always been a problem for COCOM
countries. Progress is being made in this arena, and DOD
believes the potential risk of technology loss through these
countries has been significantly reduced. Some non-COCOM
countries are, in effect, choosing to institute COCOM level
of controls as their awareness grows of the risk to their
security posed by increased Soviet access to Western high
technology. 19
18. John Konfala, "A Defense Department Perspective on
Export Controls (II)," in: Bernard L. Seward, Jr.,
Technology Control, Competition and National Security:
Conflict and Consensus , New York: University Press of
America, Inc., p. 54.
19. Konfala, "A Defense Department Perspective on
Export Controls (II)," p. 54.
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J. THE FUTURE IMPORTANCE OF COCOM
The 1985 EAAA is the latest attempt to find the optimum
compromise between how best to protect Western military
security, while still stimulating economic growth and
vigorous scientific enterprise. While regulating our
national policies is important, the control of strategic
technology varies directly with the level of united effort
within the Western alliance. As noted earlier, following
World War II the United States functioned as the fulcrum of
technology transfer because of its preeminence in that area.
By the 1980 's, the situation had changed markedly. A decade
ago, the United States was generating approximately 75
percent of the world's technology. The U.S. share today is
estimated at 50 percent with some projections pointing to a
possible decrease to 30 percent within another decade.
Consequently, by the mid-1990s the amount of technology
under direct control of the United States will have dropped
by as much as 60 percent since World War Two. 20
This dispersion of technology means that U.S.
adversaries will have an increasing variety of locations
from which to obtain strategic commodities and manufacturing
know-how. Many of these countries may not share the
strategic outlook of the United States, and may be willing
to transfer technology to potential U.S. adversaries. One
20. Moore, "A Commerce Department Perspective on
Export Controls (I), 11 p. 41.
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of the crucial challenges facing the United States and its
allies is to persuade such countries that the possession of
crucial technologies also brings with it obligations and
responsibilities. COCOM remains the single most viable
organization through which U.S. and allied export controls
are coordinated.
For whatever reason, either in spite of, or because of
its informal nature, progress is being made in COCOM. In
the next section of this thesis, we take a close look at the
huge apparatus the Soviet Union maintains to acquire Western
technology, in order to identify the necessity of
multilateral controls.
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III. SOVIET ACQUISITION METHODS
The choice between protecting Western military security
and free enterprise is a major debate both in the national
and international forum. At the center of this argument are
technology, and the superiority one gets from achieving a
more capable military machine than his adversary. It has
been said that the United States is at war. "Whether we
consider this to be the Protracted Conflict initiated in
1917 by the Bolsheviks or something new brought about by the
march of technology in this century, the war is taking place
and it cannot be escaped. "^ Because the United States is
dedicated to a strategy of stability, of being the
stabilizing rather than a disturbing power, we have conceded
the initiative and to a great extent been bound to a policy
of reacting to Communist advances. In doing this the
western world has previously, and for that matter, still
relies on its superior technology to maintain the balance
against superior Communist forces. It is this technical
superiority that the Soviets strive to reduce, in order to
close the gap in sophisticated weaponry.
The Soviet Union, unable to develop certain technologies
with their own resources, have sought to acquire needed
1. Stefan T. Possony and J.E. Pournelle, The Strategy
of Technology: Winning the Decisive War , Cambridge:
University Press of Cambridge, Inc., 1970, p. 1.
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innovations from the west both by legal and illegal means.
Using various acquisition methods to acquire a spectrum of
Western technologies, the Soviets have saved billions of
dollars and have contributed significantly to their military
prowess. 2 Stopping or inhibiting the Soviet's extensive
acquisition of military-related Western technology in ways
that are both effective and appropriate in the multinational
forum, is one of the most complex and urgent issues facing
the Western World today.
In some circles, such as the Department of Commerce, it
is felt that this viewpoint is somewhat exaggerated, but
even they concede the need for export regulations when
confronted by the facts. A close look at the Soviet
bureaucracy developed for acquiring western technology,
along with the financial and manpower resources dedicated to
this effort, would convince any skeptic of the threat. By
looking at this extensive organization and the recent well
documented compromise of western technology through "The
Toshiba Incident," it may be possible to speculate about the
validity of these accusations, and the cost to western
security.
Since at least the 1930s, the Soviet Union has devoted
vast amounts of its financial and manpower resources to the
2. Central Intelligence Agency White Paper, "Soviet
Acquisition of Military Significant Western Technology: An
Update," U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1985, p.
7.
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acquisition of Western technology that would enhance its
military power and improve the efficiency of its military
manufacturing technology. Today this Soviet effort is
massive, well-planned, and well-managed, a national level
program approved at the highest party and governmental
levels. This program involves espionage by hostile
intelligence officers, overt collection by Bloc officials,
acquisition by scientific exchange program participants, and
illegal trade-related activity. This acquisition program is
well-managed, well-funded and is operated by the key
Military Industrial Commission (VPK) officials. The VPK
coordinates the development of all Soviet weapons systems as
well as the Soviet national-level programs to acquire
Western technology. 3 Former Deputy Director of the CIA,
Admiral Bobby R. Inman speaks of Soviet efforts.
The Soviets have never been reluctant to use whatever
means are available to obtain access to Western
technology. They want to get their hands on advanced
research and actual applications that can be quickly
translated into their weapon systems. And advanced
computer research, which is the heart of missile quidance
systems, is at the top of the Soviets 'most wanted 1 list
of technoloqies. 4
3. CIA, "Soviet Acquisition of Military Siqnificant
Western Technoloqy: An Update," p. 3.
4. Junis Ellis, "Bobby Ray Inman: The Admiral and Ex-
CIA Spymaster Talks About Our War With Japan, Soviet
Espionaqe and LeCarre ' s Truthful Fictions," GEO . May 1984,
pp. 18-22.
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A. THE SOVIET SYSTEM
The Soviets and their Warsaw pact allies have three ways
of obtaining militarily significant Western technology and
equipment through legal and illegal means:
1. They use their scientific and technological agreements
with the west to facilitate access to the new technologies
that are emerging from the Free World's applied scientific
research efforts.
2. They spend their scarce hard currency (some of which
is borrowed from the west) , to illegally purchase
controlled equipment, as well as to legally purchase
uncontrolled advanced western technologies having
military-industrial applications. 5
3. They task their intelligence services to acquire
illegally those U.S. and Western technologies that are
classified and export controlled. 6
The Soviet Union maintains two high level programs to
manage the acquisition of Western hardware and documents,
both of which are directed by the Soviet Defense Council:
First, Moscow has a program to raise the technical levels
of weapons and military equipment as well as to improve
the technical levels of manufacturing processes. This
program is managed by the most powerful organization in
defense production—the Military Industrial Commission
(VPK) of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers.
Mainly, although not exclusively, through intelligence
channels, the VPK seeks one-of-a-kind military and dual-
use hardware, blueprints, product samples, and test
equipment to improve the technical levels and performance
of Soviet weapons, military equipment, and defense
5. Jan Sejna, "Soviet and East European Acquisition
Efforts: An Inside View", in Charles M. Perry and Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff, Selling the Rope to Hang Capitalism? , New York:
Pergamon-Brassey ' s International Defense Publishers, 1987,
p. 70.
6. Gary K. Bertsch and John R. Mclntyre, National
Security and Technology Transfer: The Strategic Dimensions
of East-West Trade , Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1983, p.
93.
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manufacturing equipment and reduce any dependency on
advanced Western products. This is done in large part by
exploiting and adopting design concepts embodied in
acquired equipment and associated documents.
Second, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Scientific and
Technology Committee, and Soviet intelligence services
administer a trade diversion program to acquire relatively
large numbers of dual-use manufacturing and test equipment
for direct use in production lines. This program seeks
export controlled microelectronics, computer,
communication, machinery, robotics, diagnostic, and other
equipment to increase through output of weapon producing
industries. 7
These two programs, which apparently are administered
separately, are the hub of the Soviet effort. The VPK
program is principally, but not exclusively, an industrial
security and counterintelligence concern for the West. It
involves espionage by hostile intelligence officers, overt
collection by Bloc officials, acquisition by scientific
exchange program participants, and illegal trade-related
activity. The trade diversion program principally involves
export control and international compliance issues.
Characteristics of these programs overlap, further
complicating the design of adequate countermeasures:
1. Both Soviet programs seek the same products.
2. Soviet industrial ministries request technology and
equipment through both programs.
3. The collection channels overlap and in some cases the
same Soviet individuals (intelligence officers and
others) are involved in each program.
7. Seward, Technology Control, Competition, and
National Security; Conflict and Consensus , p. 288.
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The VPK includes the top executives of most of the key
Soviet defense manufacturing ministries. Full VPK
membership is given to the Ministers of Aviation, Machine
Building (projectiles and explosives) , Defense Industry
(armor and electro-optics) , General Machine Building
(strategic missiles and space) , Communications Equipment,
Radio (radars and large-scale computers) , Medium Machine
Building (nuclear weapons and high-energy lasers)
,
Shipbuilding, and Electronics. It is a small but powerful
group, responsible for centrally overseeing the research,
development, and production of all Soviet weapon systems.
It coordinates developments between its chief customer, the
Ministry of Defense, and the key suppliers, the defense-
industrial ministries. As the expediter for weapons
development projects, it is the principal Soviet military
instrument for eliminating or circumventing the
inefficiencies characteristic of the Soviet economic
system. 8
As part of its responsibility to enforce schedules and
to ensure that technical and performance specifications are
met, the VPK translates requests for Western hardware and
documents, principally by the design bureaus of 12
industries, into lists of collection requirements. It is
these lists of specifically needed western technology that
8. Seward, Technology Control, Competition, and
National Security: Conflict and Consensus , p. 289.
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are distributed to the GRU and KGB, once approved by the
Defense Council. These intelligence organizations develop
operational plans that target specific western technologies
for acquisition. Mr. Jan Sejna, a former Chief of Staff to
the Czechoslovakian Minister of Defense explains that;
Every November the Defense Council approves operational
plans for the GRU and KGB. After six months, the Defense
Council evaluates how successful they have been. In
particularly important cases, daily monitoring takes




The emphasis the Soviet bloc puts into this evolution,
can be summed up by Mr. Sejna in the following statement:
Since 1959, the decision of the Soviet Defense Council has
been very clear: All intelligence services—and here I am
referring to my experience in Czechoslovakia—were ordered
to select the best cadres, as they are called, and to
prepare them for technology-related espionage work. In
Czechoslovakia, we selected the best military officers
from the artillery, air force, and chemical troops, all
highly educated professionals. They were then trained in
intelligence work for two years, and all transferred
directly to commercial organizations. The danger thus
presented is that these people are not just simple agents.
They are professionals directed in their work from the
highest levels. When we initially received the order from
Moscow, 200 officers were selected in that first year for
military intelligence alone, and this continued every year
thereafter. 10
Mr. Sejna goes on to say that all technologies targeted were
selected by the Soviet Union. He emphasizes that it must be
remembered that the intelligence services of the satellite
countries are merely branches of the Soviet intelligence
9. Sejna, "Soviet and East European Acquisition
Efforts: An Inside View," p. 71.
10. Sejna, "Soviet and East European Acquisition
Efforts: An Inside View," p. 70
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services, and, from a strategic viewpoint, the Soviet Union
must come first.
The Soviets using these methods have been very
successful in acquiring Western technology, and have
increased manpower allocations to further improve their
technology collection efforts. Western intelligence
agencies indicate that now Soviet military designers
carefully chose the Western designs, engineering approaches,
and equipment most appropriate to meet their deficiencies
and needs. Numerous weapon systems and platforms were
derived from technology acquired from the west. Lists
mentioning various systems such as fire control systems for
our most recently deployed aircraft, F-14, F-15 and F-18,
U.S. ballistic missile defense concepts, and missile silo
concepts, are just a few in the long list of acquisitions
made by the Soviet Union. -1- 1
Western Intelligence sources believe that the Soviets
put so much faith in this effort that they proceed with
difficult projects by anticipating their acquisition of the
foreign know-how during project development from outside
sources. The evidence strongly indicates that their
decision to continue a project, stalled due to a
technological bottleneck, correctly assumed the acquisition
11. Gary K. Bertsch and John R. Mclntyre, National
Security and Technology Transfer: The Strategic Dimensions
of East-West Trade , p. 99.
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of the deficient technology from the west. 12 It is this
theory that seems the most striking. In essence, the Soviet
Union has so much faith in their espionage ability that they
can count on acquiring Western technology to supplement
their in-progress development of weapon-systems. The CIA
has documented hundreds of cases to prove this point, the
latest public example being the amazing resemblance between
the U.S. and the Soviet's space shuttle. 13
In an attempt to further appreciate this theory, one can
compare this theory with the latest openly publicized
compromise of Western technology, the Toshiba Incident.
Knowledge of this incident is required if one is to show
that this theory explains this significant breech of Western
security.
B. THE TOSHIBA INCIDENT
Vital computerized propeller milling machines were
compromised to the Soviet Union by the Japanese firm of
Toshiba Machinery Company, a subsidiary which is 51 percent
owned by the Toshiba Corporation, and the Norwegian state-
owned company of Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk. The Japanese firm
sold the Soviets the milling machines, while the Norwegian
firm sold the computer controls that operate these
12. Jack Vorona, "Technology Transfer and Soviet




13. CIA White Paper, "Soviet Acquisition of Military
Significant Western Technology: An Update," pp. 31-34.
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sophisticated machines. These two sales were a premeditated
violation of the rules of the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) , an organization that
oversees trade between the West and the Communist bloc. The
COCOM rules prohibit industrialized Western democracies from
exporting certain high technology and strategic materials to
the Eastern bloc countries. These milling machines will
allow the Soviets to mass produce guieter warship
propellers, making them harder to locate by western
detection methods. At the time of this Toshiba, Kongsberg
transaction, it was common knowledge that the Soviet Union
was engaged in a major initiative to catch up with American
guieting technology, the key to making any submarine fleet
safe from detection. 14 This eguipment was high on the list
of technologies that the Western Allies and Japan bar from
export to the Soviet bloc. Depending on the source,
estimates anywhere from $30 to $50 billion will be reguired
to develop new electronic devices to regain the tactical
advantage the U.S. enjoyed before the Soviets received this
new eguipment. These milling machines, which enable the
Soviet Union to produce significantly guieter propellers,
threaten the entire Western alliance. 15
14. David E. Sanger, "A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital
Tools to Russians," New York Times . 12 June 1987, p. Q2
.
15. Senator Heinz rebuttal on the Senate floor, of
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Richard Armmitage assessment
of the damage done by the Toshiba/Kongsberg sale.
Congressional Record—Senate , Wednesday 16 March 1988, p.
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This transaction was initiated when suspected KGB agents
approached WAKO KOEKI , a small Japanese trading firm with
offices in Moscow. The Soviets indicated they needed to
import large numerically controlled machine tools, precision
instruments that can reduce by months the long process of
making a propeller. Wako Koeki approached Toshiba Machine,
who then sent a Toshiba executive to Moscow to negotiate the
contract. 16 This deal culminated in the delivery of 4 nine-
axis-type propeller milling machines to the Soviet Union in
1982-83. These machines are worth four to five million
dollars apiece, stand approximately two stories tall, and
can precision cut and shape propellers from nine different
angles at the same time, to produce a 270,000 pound, 30 ft
in diameter propeller. Under the regulations adopted by
COCOM, which sets exports rules, no machine tool with more
than three independent axes is to be exported to the Soviet
Union or its allies. 17
S2355.
Representative Dan Daniel, Virginia, statement
before the House Armed Services Committee, H.R. 2948 and
H.R. 2974 , 22 July 1987, p. 2.
Jerome Cahill, "Ban on Toshiba Asked in Senate,"
New York Daily News , 19 June 1987, p. C14
.
16. Sanger, "A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to
Russians," p. 1.
17. Sanger, "A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to
Russians," p. 3.
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Encouraged by the success of the 1982-83 transaction,
Toshiba Marine delivered four more five-axis-type
numerically controlled milling machines in 1984. These
five-axis machines are the second largest of the propeller
milling machines, smaller only than the nine-axis machines,
delivered a year earlier. It was previously thought that
the Soviets were using Toshiba's nine-axis machines to make
submarine propellers. The United States now believes that
the smaller five-axis machines were used in the making of
submarine propellers and the larger nine-axis devices are
used for aircraft carriers or other large ships. The
Soviets now have under construction, and are about to deploy
their first large aircraft carrier, the Tbilisi (formerly
called the Leonid Brezhnev). 18
Toshiba could have provided the entire computer package
for the operation of these milling machines, as they did do
in the case of the five-axis machines. In the case of the
nine-axis machines, the Soviets, for some unknown reason,
insisted on using computer controls from Kongsberg Trade,
the marketing arm of Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk. 19 It was at
this time that the Soviets contacted Bernard Green, a
British national and the Kongsberg Trading Company's sales
manager who supervised the sale of the $2 million dollar
18. Sen. Jesse Helms (R, NC) , "Toshiba—A Pattern of
Betrayal," Congressional Record , 19 June 1987, p. S8372.
19. Sanger, "A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to
Russians," p. 2.
41
numerical controller (the computer that guides the system)
to the Soviets. 20
Once the Soviets completed these transactions, both
Toshiba Marine and Kongsberg began a series of deceptions to
obtain export licenses for moving the equipment past
Japanese and Norwegian custom officials. Toshiba applied to
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) for
a permit to ship machines limited to two axes, well within
the COCOM rules. The Japanese authorities overlooked the
fact that the model number indicated for shipment wasn't
mentioned anywhere in Toshiba's sales brochure. Toshiba
said that the machinery was going to be used for a civilian
purpose of improving the electric power utility in
Leningrad. 21
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry had
simply trusted that the company was telling the truth. None
of the ministry's 3 export control inspectors, who review
200,000 applications a year, questioned the permit. The
system, which was a trust relationship between industry and
government, broke down.
Mr. Bernard Green applied with the Norwegian Trade
Ministry to export a numerical controller that Kongsberg
specifically manufactures for Soviet-bloc trade because it
20. David Silverberg, "Results Mixed on Norwegian Push




21. Helms, "A Pattern of Betrayal," p. S8372.
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can be used only in less sophisticated two-axis milling
machines. Investigators say Mr. Green had made an oral
agreement with the Soviet Union to ship a variant of the
computer that could control a nine-axis machine. The
difference between the two models lies in microscopic
circuitry and no customs official would be able to tell the
difference. 22 Both governments involved depended heavily on
the truthfulness of the companies that were seeking to
profit from increased trade with the Soviet Union. The
governmental inspectors in both cases appeared to lack the
technological sophistication to challenge the companies 1
claims about the capabilities of the equipment being
exported.
Once the export permits were received and the machinery
exported, both Toshiba Machine engineers and Kongsberg
computer specialists worked side by side in Leningrad to
fine-tune the milling machines. This assembly process took
months to accomplish, where workers were taken through the
back gate of the Baltic Shipyard and worked under the
constant observation of the KGB. As part of the deal, the
Soviet Union even obtained a five-year service agreement. 23
22. Stuart Auerbach, "Another High-Tech Sale to
Soviets by Toshiba Reported," Washington Post . 20 June 1987,
p. C2.
23. Sanger, "A Bizarre Deal Diverts Vital Tools to
Russians," p. 1.
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There are two different versions concerning how the
scheme was uncovered by western authorities. The American
version indicated that the Pentagon received a series of
clues with respect to Soviet submarines, and then worked
backwards. There is some speculation that Soviet submarines
might have been producing fainter propeller noises, and
Pentagon officials put the pieces of the puzzle together
which led them to Toshiba Machine. 24 According to the
Japanese, a disgruntled employee of Wako Koeki told
officials of Wako and Toshiba Machine that he would disclose
the story of the illegal exports unless he was paid to
remain silent. When he got nowhere, he carried out his
threat by writing a letter to COCOM in Paris. That
information was sent to the United States and eventually
relayed to Japan. The employee denies the accusations of
blackmail and claims he wrote the letter because the
transaction endangered Japan's security and that of the
whole free world. 25
In any event, the Japanese were first notified of the
illegal proceedings by COCOM in December 1985. During June
1986, the United States notified Japan and told MITI that
Toshiba Machine might have illegally shipped milling
24. Steven Bryen, "The Toshiba Case of Transfer of
High Technology," NPR Radio WETA FM Washington, D. C. 27
June 1987.
25. Takashi Oka, "Toshiba Whistle Blower Defends
Decision to Expose Company," Christian Science Monitor , 22
July 1987, p. 28.
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machines to Moscow. MITI contacted Toshiba Marine on both
occasions, each time Toshiba Machine maintained that it only
had shipped the two-axis machine. It wasn't until Secretary
of Defense Weinberger complained directly to Japan's Defense
Minister with detailed information in December 1986, that a
full investigation was initiated. It was this investigation
that confirmed the transaction and further tied in the
Norwegian Kongsberg-Vaapenfabrikk company. This illegal
contract earned the companies $17 million in sales. 26
In both cases, management wanted to bolster their ailing
companies and personal profit was not the motive. For the
sake of one more sale and $17 million in profit to their
companies, they compromised the free world to the tune of
approximately $30 to $50 billion dollars. American outrage
caused severe friction between the U.S. and its close
military allies, Norway and Japan. It will cost the Soviet
Union far less to produce quiet propellers with the new
machines than for the United States to develop advanced
sensors to make up for the loss. 27
Once the situation became common knowledge, both
American and Japanese governments took immediate action to
calm the outrage in Congress over the sale. Toshiba
immediately tried to put distance between itself and its
26. "Japan Alerted to Toshiba's Exports to Soviets,"
Baltimore Sun . 3 July 1987, p. ID.
27. Heinz, Congressional Record—Senate , p. S2355.
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subsidiary Toshiba Machine, and claimed no knowledge of the
transaction and insisted that the subsidiary acted
independently. The Japanese government immediately
suspended all exports to communist countries by Toshiba
Machine for a period of one year. Kongsberg permanently
suspended all sales to the Soviet Union and closed its
Eastern bloc trading arm. 28 Both the Japanese and Norwegian
governments started immediate investigations which ended up
in a total restructuring of their export process. Both
Norway and Japan started a heavy lobbying process as well,
in an effort to try and stop mounting congressional
retaliation against them. The congressional furor got so
out of hand, that the Reagan administration had to intervene
with the threat to veto any over zealous legislation.
In any event, this incident severely strained relations
between the United States, Japan and Norway, if not just
from the technology leak standpoint, then by the out-of-
proportion punishment and generally punitive attitude of the
United States. Everyone's actions were not conducive to
NATO solidarity, especially at a time when a unified
response and policy was proven necessary to stop further
leaks. It always seems that everyone reacts after the fact,
although it has been well known that the Soviets seek
Western technology. Why was propeller technology so
28. "Norwegian Defense Firm Stops Sales to Communist
Nations," Detroit News . 18 June 1987, p. 3.
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important? It is important to qualify the Soviet motivation
for acquiring the computerized milling machines.
C. CORRELATING THE EVIDENCE
On 19 May 1985 the FBI arrested John Walker after
witnessing the attempted drop of highly classified material
to the Soviet Union. In the opinion of some, this arrest
uncovered the greatest espionage network since the Soviets
stole the blueprints for the first atomic bomb. 29 John
Walker and his three accomplices, his son Michael, his
brother Arthur, and Jerry Whitworth had spied for the Soviet
Union over a span of 17 years prior to their arrest. The
Walker-Whitworth case had potentially compromised all secure
communications for at least ten years prior to their arrest.
By being able to intercept Naval and possibly other armed
services secure communications, the U.S. had no secrets, and
it became evident to the Soviets exactly how we were
detecting and tracking their submarines, by machinery and
propeller cavitation noise. Throughout the 1960s and 70s
the United States enjoyed a decisive superiority over the
Soviet Union in the technology of submarine warfare. The
U.S. Navy easily tracked noisy Soviet submarines, as well as
surface ships, acoustically throughout the oceans of the
world. But in the late 1970s and early 80s with the
development of their new submarines, the Soviets became
29. John Barron, Breaking the Ring , Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, Inc., 1987, p. 148.
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significantly quieter, and frustrated some previous means of
detection. 30 It wasn't until the capture of John Walker
that the United States began to put the pieces of the puzzle
together.
By understanding Soviet methods of technology
acquisition, the Toshiba Incident, and the Walker-Whitworth
espionage case, some significant correlations can be drawn
between these events, to test Western Intelligence and
Department of Defense claims with open-source evidence. It
is the opinion of the author that the national security
arguments for technology control can be substantiated by
correlating the incidents that have been published in
various free world publications, with known Soviet projects
published in the same sources. By using only open sources,
interesting parallels can be drawn, giving credence to
arguments previously stated. Consider the following:
1. Soviets learn of Western detection methods as a result
of acquiring access to cryptographic data from John
Walker and Jerry Whitworth.
2. (1983), Soviets develop their first conventional
takeoff and landing aircraft carrier and lay the keel
to the initial carrier of the class in January 1983. 31
This first carrier formerly named the Leonid Brezhnev,
now has been renamed the Tbilisi.
3. (1983), Soviets target Toshiba Marine and Kongsberg
Vaapenfabrikk to acquire the first of the two
shipments of milling machines and numerical
controllers. This first shipment contained the
30. Barron, Breaking the Ring , p. 24.
31. "The Soviet Aircraft Carrier—An Update," Naval
Forces , Vol. VII, No. II, 1986, p. 111.
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largest and most sophisticated nine-axis milling
machines. This equipment was delivered and set up
late 1982—early 1983.
4. (1983), Soviets launch first boat of the Sierra-class
SSN, and the lead boat of the Mike class SSN. The
Sierra is believed to be quieter, and the Mike, also
the largest attack submarine in the world, is believed
to have superior performance in some respects to U.S.
submarines. Both submarines are believed to be
quieter than previous Soviet fast attack submarines. 32
5. (1984), Encouraged by the success of the 82-83
transaction, Toshiba Marine delivers four more smaller
five-axis-type numerically controlled milling machines
in 1984.
6. (1984), Soviets launch first of yet another class of
SSN, the Akula. This class further indicates the
Soviet effort to incorporate better sound quieting
measures. 33
7. 5 December 1985, the Soviets launch their first
conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carrier,
Tbilisi. 10 December 1985, Soviets lay the keel to
the second Tbilisi class aircraft carrier. 34
9. (1985), Earlier in the year, 19 May 1985, John Walker
gets arrested and the FBI uncovers severe damage to
the country as a result of the spy ring lead by
Walker.
10. December 1986, Japan and Norway uncovers the illegal
sale of computerized milling machines to Moscow.
It seems apparent that the Soviets, having learned of
the United States' tracking capability, embarked on
developing three new submarine classes. The Sierra, Mike
and Akula classes were developed and launched within 12
32. "Soviet Naval Construction Slows but Threat
Grows," International Defense Review , May 1985, p. 636.
33. "Soviet Naval Construction Slows but Threat
Grows," p. 63 6.
34. Norman Polmar, "The Soviet Navy: The New Carrier,"
Proceedings , August 1988, p. 66.
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months of each other. At about the same time the Soviets
developed, began construction, and launched their first
aircraft carrier Tbilisi, shortly after their new
submarines.
It seems more than coincidental that just prior to the
launching of the Sierra and Mike class submarines, and just
as the keel was laid on the Tbilisi, the Soviets made their
move on the computerized milling machines. Making sure they
got the largest and most capable machines on the first
transaction, the Soviets acguired these machines just months
prior to the launching of their first new SSN's. What is
even more a coincidence is that these first milling machines
were the largest available, able to manufacture large
propellers to fit anything in their inventory, as well as
their new aircraft carrier that would be launched within a
couple of years.
Having been successful on their first attempt, the
Soviets went back for four more milling machines. Upon
receipt of the less capable machines in the second
transaction, coincidentally the Akula class SSN makes its
appearance about the same time. One year later the Soviets
launch the Tbilisi, just as the U.S. starts to uncover the
Walker case, which is then followed by the Toshiba incident.
Of course this is pure speculation on the course of
events based on the open literature. It is the opinion of
the author though, that this remarkable concurrence of
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events is more than just a coincidence. Based on the
previous information mentioned, it seems that the Soviets
are able to plan on Western technology, not only during the
initial stages of a project, such as the Tbilisi, but they
are also able to integrate Western acquisitions directly
into existing projects, such as the Sierra, Mike and Akula
class submarines. It is understood that this is pure
conjecture on the part of the author, but the facts that are
stated in the open sources fit so well, that this inference
can't be avoided.
In order to further understand how a diversion, such as
the Toshiba incident could happen, a closer look at each
country's export controls is required. By looking at the
emphasis a certain country places on their export
procedures, along with the previously discussed criteria,
only then will we be able to completely understand this
phenomenon. Hopefully, understanding why these diversions
happen is the first step to correcting the discrepancies.
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IV. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER/EXPORT CONTROLS AND JAPAN
A. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, strategic technology usually originated
from military research, and the proliferation of such
innovations were easily controlled within the various
military organizations. Today a large portion of the
strategic technological improvements come from the
civilian/commercial sector, which are then implemented into
some sort of military application. Japan, a country who
spends about one percent of their Gross National Product on
defense, develops a significant portion of these
technological improvements from their huge commercial
industrial complex. This presents the enormous problem, of
an adversary obtaining the civilian product, such as a
computer, and then implementing the technological innovation
into their own weapon systems, which then could be used
against the initial manufacturing country.
As mentioned earlier, COCOM is the informal multilateral
organization through which the United States and its allies
attempt to coordinate the national controls they apply to
the export of strategic materials and technology to the
Communist Bloc. Technological superiority is what the
Western world has relied upon in equipping its forces. This
technical superiority is used as an off-set to the
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quantitative superiority that the Warsaw Pact maintains. It
is this technical superiority that the Soviets constantly
strive to reduce in order to close the gap and swing their
correlation of forces equation to their advantage. The
technology base, as well as the export controls, vary
significantly throughout the membership of COCOM. All
things considered, Japan is one of the most important
countries in COCOM, both in terms of its present
technological base and its potential for future expansion.
The strong Japanese economy, industrial base and
technological prowess, is a symbol of national pride. This,
coupled with their initiatives to constantly improve in
these areas, clearly offer new opportunities for the Soviet
Union's failing economy. If General Secretary Gorbachev is
successful at lowering tensions between Japan and the Soviet
Union enough to increase trade between the two countries, it
will most likely increase the flow of strategic dual-use
technology to the Soviet Bloc. Increased trade in the form
of turn-key operations and joint ventures, combined with the
previously demonstrated Japanese inability at controlling
technology could adversely affect the entire Western
alliance.
B. JAPAN AS A TARGET
As mentioned in Chapter III, a lot is known of the
Soviet acquisition methods and their ability to obtain
Western technology through both legal and illegal means.
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The Soviets maintain a massive global program to acquire
Western technology. Because of Japan's technical
proficiency and lax export controls, it remains one of the
most lucrative targets within this Soviet program.
Within the Soviet global network to acquire technology,
no other country has been as notorious for being a "spy
paradise" as Japan. Stanislav Levchenko, former KGB officer
who defected to the United States in 1979, verified the
various methods that the KGB used to acquire technology, and
that Japan was the key target. 1 He concluded that the value
of the technology acquired from these various operations is
much greater than the annual operating costs of entire KGB.
This is far from being an exaggeration, but is quite an
understatement if you look at the several hundred examples
of Soviet military equipment and weapons benefiting from
Western technology and products. 2 The fact is that the
Soviet Union has been successful in transforming Western
research, development, inventiveness and productive genius
into a major resource of the Soviet state. This is forcing
Western nations to spend billions of dollars to overcome
Soviet weapons capabilities that would not be in place if
they were able to control this technology leak.
1. John Barron, KGB Today; The Hidden Hand . New York:
Reader's Digest Press, 1983, p. 195.
2. Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Acquisition of
Military Significant Western Technology: An Update," pp.
31-34.
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The Japanese, until recently, had no laws against
espionage. Soviet officials without diplomatic immunity who
are caught by the Japanese police simply board an Aeroflot
flight back to Moscow. It wasn't until the recently
embarrassing Toshiba incident, and under pressure applied by
the United States, that the Japanese decided to improve
their resistance against Soviet espionage efforts. The
magnitude of the problem can be fully appreciated when the
Prime Minister is openly critical of the absence of anti-
espionage legislation in Japan. Prime Minister Nakasone,
making his view clear at the Diet and other forums, stated
that there is no other country like Japan that serves as a
"sanctuary for spies." 3 Mr Maloof says that the Japanese
have just recently taken the steps needed to improve their
export control system, which has resulted in a more through
screening of applications. "Although it's ironic, I have
just received a complaint from the Japanese about the amount
of time it takes to process their applications in Japan
now." 4 This may be a further indication of the low priority
previously placed on controling strategic exports. You
can't expect MITI to agressively administer a technology
3. FBIS, "LDP Plans to Submit Amended Anti-espionage
Bill," Japan Report . 31 March 1986, pp. 38-39.
4 Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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control program, when its primary responsibility is to
promote exports.
The Toshiba incident previously mentioned in Chapter II
was the final straw that triggered this effort at
strengthening anti-espionage legislation, as well as the
tightening of export controls on strategic technology.
Actually, the Toshiba incident caused this recent effort,
but the triggering mechanism was the outrage within Congress
over this unfortunate sale. The Toshiba incident brought
public opinion to bear on the ineffectiveness of Japan's
export controls. These controls, which are administered by
Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
,
/
had been too lax for sometime and were under constant
scrutiny from the United States. This incident showed just
how easily a Japanese company can circumvent the system and
cause irreparable damage to Western security. These two
sales were a premeditated violation of the rules of COCOM.
Both governments involved depended heavily upon the
truthfulness of the companies that were seeking to profit
from increased trade with the Soviet Union. The government
inspectors in both cases appeared to lack the technological
sophistication to challenge the companies' claims about the
capabilities of the equipment being exported.
C. JAPAN'S CONTROLS
The United States, which is the driving force in
increasing COCOM 's effectiveness, has been actively pursuing
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tighter controls among the membership countries. Each
country is respons-ible for managing its own controls. In
the case of Japan, its reputation spoke for itself. Since
this incident both Norway and Japan have made efforts to
tighten their respective controls. Norway permanently
suspended all sales to the Soviet Union and initiated a
total restructuring of their export process. Japan banned
Toshiba Machine from exporting to Communist countries for
one year. The stiffest penalty ever imposed previously for
a violation of COCOM rules was a one-month ban. 5 Penalties
like this hardly discourage illegal transactions but Japan
did make significant efforts to curb future sales to the
Soviet bloc.
Compared to the Japanese initial system of promoting
exports, no matter what their nature or destination, the
efforts they made to strengthen their export controls
greatly improved the system. The Japanese Diet passed a law
to stiffen penalties against COCOM violators. It extends
the statute of limitations from three to five years,
increases the maximum prison sentence from one to five
years, raises the financial penalty, and bans exports by the
violator for three years. 6 MITI has taken steps within the
5. Chalmers Johnson, "Japanese-Soviet Relations in the
Early Gorbachev Era," Asian Survey . Vol. XXVII, No. 11,
November 1987, p. 1157.
6. Barbara Bradley, "Shipping Sensitive Technology to
the Soviet Union-Cases Mount." Christian Science Monitor , 12
November 1987, p. 1.
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agency to increase the number of staff and the budget
devoted to the inspection of export licenses. Previously
MITI had approximately 4 people to screen over 2 00,000
applications. After this incident, the staff was increased




This effort, although viewed as late, was well received
in Washington, especially among the American counterparts in
the Pentagon responsible for controlling technology flow to
the Warsaw Pact. The Defense Technology and Security Agency
saw that this was a start to better export controls, but the
changes made in Japan on paper are not even half as strong
as those in the United States, and their application and
efficiency remains to be seen. In every above-mentioned
category the United States maintains tougher controls, in
terms of sanctions and personnel devoted to export control
and technology transfer. The biggest fundamental difference
between the two systems is that the United States system is
not administered by just one agency, and certainly not the
agency responsible for promoting trade. In the United
States the Commerce, Defense and State Departments act as a
balance to each other in administering the system. Although
there is a vast improvement in MITI ' s performance, the
7. Daniel Sneider, "Japan Curbs Sale of Illegal
Technology to Soviet Bloc," Christian Science Monitor . 30
March 1988, p. 1.
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agency is primarily charged with promoting, not restricting
trade.
D. SOVIET INTEREST IN JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY
It is in the United States' best interest that controls
continue to improve within Japan. The most obvious fact
that the United States can count on is that the Japanese are
committed to increasing their high technology base, both in
quantity and quality, well into the twenty-first century.
Keeping Japan's future technological prowess in mind, and
the Soviet efforts to attain this technology in the past,
technology flow to the east may still increase. Knowing
that the Soviet Union's appetite for Western technology will
continue to increase, not only in their commercial sector,
but with their military industrial complex as well, it can
be expected that Gorbachev will continue to make every
effort to increase economic cooperation between the two
countries. The energy that Gorbachev is committing to his
"glasnost" and "perestroika" policies, in order to give the
Soviet Union a less threatening appearance, is an example of
this effort. Should Gorbachev be successful in Japan, this
will have strong implications on technology transfer, and
will not be in the United States' best interest. One only
has to look at the impact of Western technology on the
development of the present Soviet economy, and then identify
the potential generators of future technology, to identify
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future Soviet interests. Japan is a target now and will
continue to be in the future.
E. DISTINCT FEATURES OF JAPANESE/SOVIET TRADE
One of the central components in the Soviet Union's
foreign economic policy is the legal purchase of needed
Western technology. This technology has been crucial to the
accomplishment of planned targets and the development of
export potential. The Soviets like to stress compatibility
between the resource-poor developed capitalist nations and
the resource-rich Soviet Union. To the Soviet Union, this
makes increased technology trade look like a rational
response to the international scientific-technical
revolution. 8
There are two distinct features in the structure of
Soviet technology trade. The first is a preference for
turn-key, co-production and specialization agreements, often
financed with compensation payments. In compensation
agreements goods and equipment are paid for on a credit
basis with the credit to be paid off by deliveries of goods
or products produced. The most common example is pipe for
gas, where large-diameter pipe is purchased and paid for by
deliveries of gas. The second feature is the concentration
of technology imports within certain sectors, such as
8. Michael J. Bradshaw, "Trade and High Technology,"
in: Rodger Swearingen, Siberia and the Soviet Far East .
Stanford: Hoover Institution Press 1987, p. 108.
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chemicals, metalworking machinery, heavy vehicles, oil
drilling and exploration equipment, etc. An obvious
advantage of compensation agreements is that they provide
technology without the expenditure of scarce Soviet foreign
currency. Often the Western partner is responsible for
marketing the product in the West, and therefore has a
vested interest in the satisfactory performance of the
Soviet plant. The incentive to the west for entering into
these agreements was the availability of plentiful,
relatively cheap raw materials. The major advantage for the
Soviets with turn-key projects, is that they provide rapid
improvements in the technical level of a given industry and
depending on the degree of Western involvement, they may
circumvent many of the economic and social problems
associated with Soviet society.
The net impact of Western technology goes beyond the
immediate benefits of improved techniques, and may have a
substantial effect on other industries and regions within
the domestic economy. On a national scale one can identify
the resource allocation benefits relating to technology
transfer. The additional increased productivity that
results from using Western technology may release labor and
resources for other projects. Soviet officials have
reported that imported chemical plants have cut production
costs, increased labor productivity, and reduced labor and
raw material demands. This exemplifies the Department of
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Defense argument that the resource-relating function of
imported technology enables the Soviet Union to overcome
domestic economic problems without having to reduce military
spending. Thus to the Department of Defense, all forms of
technology transfer are seen to have strategic
implications. 9
The resource rich areas where the Soviets have
predominantly focused these turn-key and co-productions
operations have been in Siberia and the Soviet Far East.
Because of the vast distances between the Far East and
European markets, the major foreign participant in the
Soviet Far Eastern economy has been Japan. Japan supplies
the industrial plants and equipment, and the Soviet Union
supplies the raw materials. This is the distinct structure
of Soviet-Japanese trade. The Soviets have indicated the
importance placed on Japan's role in supporting the
development of their eastern regions. The willingness with
which Japan moved into this role is frequently noted in
Japanese literature. "The real benefits obtained in terms
of assured supplies of raw materials from Soviet sources and
the huge expansion of Soviet markets for Japanese




9. Bradshaw, "Trade and High Technology," pp. 109-111.
10. Raymond S. Mathieson, Japan's Role in Soviet
Economic Growth: Transfer of Technology Since 1965 , New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1979, p. 16.
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It is these turn-key and co-production operations that
have required the strengthening of COCOM, and contributed to
the strategic technology acquisition of the Warsaw Pact.
The Soviets have been able to obtain the technology needed
to strengthen their military industrial complex both through
legal co-production agreements and their illegal acquisi-
tions disguised as legal transactions. In the case of the
Toshiba incident, both the Norwegian numerical controller
and the Japanese milling machines got by export and customs
officials by deception. Because it is virtually impossible
for COCOM to monitor illegal transactions among the two
companies conducting the co-production agreement, there is a
correlation between the amount of legal trade you conduct
with the Soviet Union, and the risk of illegal diversion of
strategic technology. Present and former Japanese trade
officials from numerous small to medium-sized trading
companies, such as Wako Koeki, the broker for the Toshiba
deal, have stated that there is a great deal of pressure
from the Soviet Union to procure contracts. "Often, they
say, they are offered large 'inducements' from Soviet
officials to bend or break rules and export proscribed
commodities. All of this has led to a climate of relaxed
technology security." 11
11. "Technology Export: Will Japan Tighten Tech
Security?" Research and Development , September 1987, p. 39.
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F. IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES
The Japanese personnel increase to 103 people for
screening export license applications was a great
improvement. However, the United States employs over 7 50
individuals through-out government to do the same job. The
United States maintains six times the number of personnel of
any member within COCOM, yet it does the smallest percentage
of trade with the Soviet bloc than any other member.
Ironically the United States has the largest number of cases
under consideration before COCOM, and prosecutes more export
violators than any other nation within COCOM. 12 This also
shows the competitive inequity given to the U.S. exporter
because they comply with the law. Consequently, if
Gorbachev is successful at making the Soviet Union appear
less threatening, and this has a spin-off effect of
increasing Western economic assistance to the Soviet Union,
which I'm sure he is counting on, then the Japanese system
may remain obsolete. By increasing the number of
transactions between Japan and the Soviet bloc, this has a
direct impact on the assets available to monitor and control
technology transfer, which in the case of Japan, have been
and will continue to be inadequate.
The key concept in controlling strategic technology
within one's borders is political will. In the case of
Japan, they have given a higher priority to aligning their
12. Interview with Michael Maloof, 10 February 1989.
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foreign policy with that of the United States than with the
Soviet Union. This has worked to our advantage because
Japan is much more interested in maintaining good trade
relations with the United States than with the Soviet Union.
Although the Japanese are the second largest Western trading
nation with the Soviet Union, behind West Germany, trade
with the Soviet Union accounts for only two percent of
Japan's total trade volume. 13 The United States remains a
much larger market for Japanese goods which they are more
interested in maintaining. The Toshiba incident is a
perfect example of the effort and interest the Japanese have
in the U.S. market. Toshiba made about $17 million on the
sale of milling machines to the Soviet Union. They spent
almost the same amount in the most aggressive lobbying
campaign ever mounted by a foreign company to quell the
anger of Congress. This was done in an effort to stop
Congress from banning Toshiba's $10 billion a year sales in
the United States. 14
G. JAPAN'S FUTURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The question is, will the United States be this
fortunate in the future? With the enormous efforts that the
Japanese are putting into their new "Technopolis Strategy,"
13. Kazuo Ogawa, "Economic Relations with Japan," in:
Swearingen, Siberia and the Soviet Far East , pp. 158-160.
14. Stuart Auerbach, "How Toshiba Took the Hill by
Storm," Washington Post . 10 January 1988, p. C3
.
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the Japanese may view Soviet natural resources in a
different light, or technology under their development and
possession differently than we would. The United States may
find itself in a position, that even if we are the driving
force in COCOM, the technology may not be ours to regulate.
We may find that we won't have a leg to stand on if Japan
sees it in her best interest to cultivate the Soviet market
to fuel their growing technology base. The Japanese are
already demanding a broader role in international affairs
and the management of the world economy. During President
Bush's latest visit to Tokyo, his administration was
surprised by the intensity of this message delivered by
Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita. 15 This assertiveness
could take on a much greater role in the future, considering
the Japanese investment and influence they have attained
over U.S. policy.
Today, Japan finds itself in a dilemma. Westerners are
reluctant to share their technology for fear of the
"boomerang effect," and other Asian nations are undercutting
Japan with low-cost products. Japanese researchers have
caught up with and even surpassed the West in many fields.
Japan must now innovate to maintain its competitiveness.
Creativity has become its new industrial slogan. In order
to accommodate this need, the Japanese have announced the
15. Jim Mann and Art Pine, "Japan Seeks Wider
International Role," Monterey Herald , 22 February 1989, p.
2.
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Technopolis Concept. This is the plan to build a network of
nineteen high-tech cities throughout Japan.
These cities will be based on the Silicon Valley's
spinoff development pattern and the Tsukuba Science City
outside of Tokyo. They will offer ample housing, shopping
malls, schools and universities, recreational areas, and
life-long learning centers, in an effort to create new
researchers and technologies. These cities will be linked
by bullet trains, telecommunications networks and on-line
data bases that will link researchers to the latest
developments around the world. These 19 high-tech cities
are considered the engines for Japan's economic growth into
the twenty-first century. 16
Japanese officials feel that the government will no
longer be able to force industry to march to its tune. The
previous heavy-handed approach used in regulating industry
is too time-consuming and has not worked with fast-moving,
high technology companies. Instead, government ministries,
such as MITI, must anticipate, cultivate, and promote
emerging technologies and markets in which Japan has a
competitive advantage. 17 It will be interesting to see how
much attention will be placed on controlling strategic
16. Sheridan Tatsuno, The Technopolis Strategy;
Japan, High Technology and the Control of the Twenty-First
Century
. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1986, p. XV.
17. Tatsuno, The Technopolis Strategy: Japan, High
Technology and the Control of the Twenty-First Century , p.
35.
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technology if the government is to reduce its management of
industry. As mentioned earlier, MITI is the same
organization that is presently responsible for controlling
technology exports, as pointed out, with questionable
efficiency. With no military or defense input on screening
export applications today, what will be the impact in the
future fast-paced world, where regulating industry is
considered to be too time consuming? One thing that can be
counted upon is that the Soviet Union will do whatever is
possible to take advantage of the situation. The Soviet
initiative is presently in full swing.
H. RECENT SOVIET INTIATIVES WITH JAPAN
For the first time in 16 years, a "Japan Industrial
Exposition" was opened in Moscow from 15-24 October 1986.
The Soviets indicated that they were primarily interested in
joint ventures in automobile parts and electronics. General
Secretary Gorbachev made overtures to Japan, saying "We are
hoping Japanese companies provide a stimulant to vitalize
the Soviet economy." Earlier in the year Sumitomo Group,
made up of 20 companies including such high-tech companies
as NEC and Sumitomo Electric Industries, extended for
another five years an agreement to exchange scientific
technology with the Soviet Union. Group leaders noted that
the Soviets were interested in NEC's communication equipment
and optical fiber technology produced by Sumitomo Electric.
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Japanese officials concluded that the Soviets are aiming for
the introduction of Japan's advanced technology. 18
The Soviet Union's economic rapprochement with the
countries of the West is progressing at an increasingly
rapid pace. At the forefront of their initiative is Japan.
On September 8, 1986 Deputy Chairman Marchuk, USSR Council
of Ministers who was attending the Japanese-Soviet Science
and Technology Cooperation meeting announced new joint
venture legislation which went into effect on 1 January
1987. This announcement was first conveyed to Japan among
the Western industrialized countries and is evidence that
the Soviet Union wants Japanese technology. The Soviet
Union is also granting wider authority among its bureaucracy
to negotiate with Western countries, this authority being
previously limited to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade.
Twenty ministries and agencies along with 70 major companies
will be permitted to use foreign currency and will be able
to negotiate directly with Western companies for purchases
of equipment and exports of manufactured goods. Through
these series of measures, including joint ventures with the
West, business cooperation with the Soviet Union will become
easier. The purpoe of the Soviet Union's hasty
rapprochement with Japan is restoring its own economy.
18. FBIS, "Recent Status of Industrial Cooperation
with USSR," Japan Report . 20 February 1987, pp. 30-36.
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Japanese economic experts on the Soviet Union are unanimous
on the view. 19
In this atmosphere, the Japanese export controls and
anti-espionage legislation, even though they have undergone
recent renovation, may still be inadequate. The United
States has always been, and still is, the key proponent for
strong export controls on strategic technology. This is the
function of the size of our defense budget and our desire to
maintain a superior edge in the quality of weapon systems.
If the Japanese spent as much as the United States does on
defense, then they too would be concerned with the
regulation of technology. It would be logical to assume
that they would at least confer with their defense
establishment to ponder the repercussions of the export. It
is easy to put technology transfer low on one's priorities,
when a ally is committed to maintaining the technological
advantage over the potentially common adversary. Under the
present conditions, with the benefits of the U.S. defense
umbrella its easy to see things from the economic
perspective.
I. POSSIBLE FUTURE SOVIET MOVES
For the time being, it is the priority the Japanese
place on the U.S. market, the fear of Congressional
repercussions and the distrust of the Soviet Union, that
19. FBIS, "USSR Aims at Japan's High Technology,"
Japan Report
. 5 March 1987, pp. 52-57.
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motivates them to support export controls. Gorbachev and
the Soviet Union will continue to seek every means possible
to change these priorities. Within Japanese-Soviet
relations there is a key issue that still has not been
resolved and dates back to the end of World War II. This
issue has been the return of the four islands, collectively
known as the Northern Territories, which run north to
Kamchatka from the eastern end of Hokkaido. Japan refuses
to sign a treaty ending that Pacific war until the Soviet
Union returns these islands to Japan. This issue is a
matter of national pride, and a solidifying common argument
among all the diverse political factions in Japan. Japan as
a country remains committed to the recovery of the Northern
Territories. The Northern Territories dispute is a central
issue in any emerging relationship, and serves as an
adversarial symbol between the two nations. 20
There is a great incentive for the Soviet Union to
consider returning these islands. Full normalization of
relations between the two countries is possible through the
return of all four islands, and such a event would be a true
political coup for a Prime Minister. Should this happen, it
could further modify Japan's perception of the Soviet Union
and be influential in Japan's debate over its national
security relationship with the United States. It would most
20. James F. Giblin Jr., "National Strategies and
Japan's Northern Territories," Naval War College Review .
Winter 1987, p. 53.
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certainly lead to a significant expansion in Japanese
investment in Siberia and result in an increasing dependence
on Soviet trade by Japan's economy, a situation that would
significantly decrease the role of the U.S. in technology
control.
The significance of the technology transfer issue
between the United States and Japan lies in the burden
sharing breakdown of their security relationship. The
amount of money the United States spends on defense could be
significantly reduced by restricting the flow of technology
from our COCOM allies. The countries within COCOM, such as
Japan, that maintain small defense budgets, don't see this
as a priority. The U.S. feels these countries are taking
advantage of the U.S. defense establishment and are not
doing their fair share. The COCOM countries feel that the
U.S. is trying to restrict trade to give the U.S. exporter
some sort of advantage. Incidents such as the Toshiba case
only serve to contribute to the suspicions and sense of
unfairness on the other side. It would seem that Japan and
the United States need to rearrange their relationship in
order to present the Soviet Union with a more united front.
The longer this is delayed, the better the opportunities for
the Soviet Union, and as previously explained, they will
exploit every opportunity. 21
21. Johnson, "Japanese-Soviet Relations in the Early
Gorbachev Era," p. 1160.
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Many feel that if the United States pulled out of COCOM,
the organization would dissolve in an hour. 22 The members
have significantly different views regarding defense
spending, burden sharing and the perceived threat of the
Soviet Union. As long as the United States maintains a
sufficient force in the eyes of the COCOM allies to deter
Soviet aggression, the non-U. S. members can be expected to
view strategic technology transfer issues from the economic
point of view. None of the allies is completely innocent of
serious violations of COCOM rules, but the United States is
the only one trying to strengthen the organization. As
technology proliferates so will the Soviet effort to obtain
it. An immediate concern of the United States should be
Japan, because their initiative to strengthen their
technology base is second to none and it is the primary
target of the Soviet Union.
Economic and trade relations between the Soviet Union
and Japan have a history of being consistently very active.
The future will continue to see Soviet efforts to expand
trade relations both legally and illegally. The condition
of the Soviet economy and the tremendous effort the Japanese
are putting into further developing their technology base
will put the initiative on Gorbachev. Clearly the Soviets
22. This view was conveyed to me by an important
player, previously within the system. Interview between Dr.
Stephen D. Bryen, Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
and Former Director, Defense Technology and Security
Administration, and the author, 7 February 1989.
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need Japanese technology to improve their economy more than
the Japanese need the Soviets. Just how far Gorbachev is
willing to go to acquire this technological help remains to
be seen. The control of technology flow to the east, in
which the United States has been the dominant force within
COCOM, may take on a different character if the United
States' technological prowess slips to Japan. But the key
issue in future Japanese-U.S. relations will be in their
ability to equitably distribute the burden, not only in
regards to technology transfer but with defense in general.
74
V. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: COCOM AND WEST GERMANY
A. INTRODUCTION
As we have seen, the technology base, as well as the
export controls vary significantly throughout the membership
of COCOM. Within the Western European membership of COCOM,
West Germany is the focal point of the Soviet initiative to
acquire Western technology in Europe. In addition to having
the largest population, technology and industrial base, West
Germany is the chief military ally of the United States, and
all things considered, has the weakest export controls among
the industrialized Western European nations. Securing
Western economic and technological inputs and implementing
them into the Soviet economy is a primary objective of the
Soviet Union. West Germany's inefficiency in protecting
Western innovations in the above-mentioned areas clearly
offers new opportunities for the Soviet Union's failing
economy. If General Secretary Gorbachev is successful in
lowering tensions between Western Europe, particularly West
Germany and the Soviet Union, enough to increase trade
between the two countries, it will increase the flow of
strategic dual-use technology to the Communist bloc.
Increased trade in the form of turn-key operations and joint
ventures, combined with West Germany's previously
demonstrated inability at controlling technology, will
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adversely affect the entire Western alliance. In this
chapter, I will show how West Germany plays such a key role
within the membership of COCOM, and in the arena of
strategic technology transfer in general.
B. SOVIET ACQUISITION METHODS
Once again, keeping in mind the extensive Soviet effort
to acquire Western technology described in Chapter II, West
Germany is as lucrative a target as Japan. Within the
Soviet global espionage network, West Germany plays a major
part in their effort to acquire Western technology. The
scale of the Soviet and Eastern bloc espionage efforts
directed against Western Europe is impressive both in its
overall size and in the high levels of government to which
it has occasionally penetrated. This was demonstrated most
dramatically in 1974 when Chancellor Willy Brandt was forced
to resign after one of the advisors in his cabinet was
arrested as an East German agent. The scale or effective-
ness of Soviet bloc espionage efforts at lower levels can
only be roughly determined. Government officials in Bonn
estimate that 3000 to 4000 Soviet bloc agents are active in
West Germany. Other government officials place the number
as high as 10, 000. 1
1. John Van Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western
Europe; Objectives. Instruments. Results , Santa Monica:
Rand Corporation, 1986, p. 102.
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Richard Mueller, one of the Soviets most successful West
European agents, is still at large. Mr. Mueller is a West
German citizen who is wanted in both West Germany and the
Unites States for completing numerous illegal exports of
COCOM-controlled computers, microelectronics, and other
products to the Soviet Union. His involvement with illegal
technology acquisition on behalf of the Soviet bloc dates
back to the early 1970s. By 1978 Mueller's deals were made
almost exclusively with Soviet foreign trade officials, some
of whom were intelligence officers under cover. For his
network, Mueller uses numerous dummy and front firms
throughout the world, and meets with his Soviet principals
in Moscow to mask his activities. At one time he had more
than 75 firms operating in Austria, France, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany. 2
Between 1978 and 1983 Mueller delivered to the Soviets
advanced computers, peripherals, and micro-electronics
manufacturing equipment worth at least several tens of
millions of dollars. Mueller is best known for his
attempted diversion to the Soviet Union in late 1983 of
seven large U.S. Digital Equipment Corporation VAX computers
and related hardware and software. The VAX series of super
minicomputers are valuable to the Soviets because of their
2. Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Acquisition of
Military Significant Western Technology: An Update," p. 27.
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computer-aided design (CAD) applications for microelectron-
ics fabrication. This equipment was purchased in the United
States for shipment to Mueller's dummy firms in South Africa
and West Germany for diversion to the Soviet Union, but the
shipment was seized enroute by Sweden and West Germany. 3
C. WEST GERMAN RELATIONS WITH EAST GERMANY
The single most important factor that complicates the
espionage problem as well as the trade diversion/illegal
export problem, is West Germany's desire to improve
relations with East Germany. This not only involves the
monumental counter-espionage problem of identifying an East
German from a West German, but entails all the emotional
political arguments involved with a divided country
attempting to achieve reunification. Intra-German relations
are a key factor determining the West German technology
transfer policies with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 4
Among the West Germans, their policy of "Ostpolitik" is seen
to have generated numerous political as well as economic
benefits—reduced the danger of another Berlin crisis,
created closer relations with East Germany, and achieved
repatriation of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe—all of these the West Germans seek to
3. Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Acquisition of
Military Significant Western Technology: An Update," p. 27.
4. Yergin, East-West Technology Transfer: European
Perspectives , p. 23.
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retain. The West German leadership is proud of the fact
that a quarter of a million ethnic Germans have been allowed
to resettle in West Germany since 1975. The government
ascribes this success to a conciliatory policy that eschews
explicit linkage of trade and emigration. Noting that many
ethnic Germans still seek to leave East Germany, former
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said,
All could come to a standstill. So you will understand
that the divided nation of Germans—more than sixteen
million Germans are still living in the Communist world
—
is not in a position to act as a spearhead or as a
forerunner in a conflict between the two superpowers. 5
It is in this atmosphere that the West Germans view trade
and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, which runs
directly counter to the view point of the United States. In
an interview with Dr. Stephen Bryen, when asked how West
German export controls were, his reply was, "Awful, either
they don't want to or they don't care about controlling
technology to the Soviet Union." Dr. Bryen went on to say,
"If the Toshiba incident happened in Germany, they wouldn't
give a damn." When asked if this was a function of the
amount of trade the West Germans do with the Soviet bloc,
his reply was, "Yes, the Germans could care less, and are
more interested in maintaining their relationship with the
5. John P. Hardt and Kate S. Tomlinson, "Soviet
Economic Policies in Western Europe", in: John Van
Oudenaren, Soviet Policy Toward Western Europe , p. 187.
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Soviet Union than worrying about sanctions from the United
States." 6
Most West European leaders are reluctant to return to
the cold war era and fear that full adoption of economic
sanctions would jeopardize the gains achieved during the
late 60s and early 1970s, specifically reduction in tensions
in Europe and increased trade with the East. Intra-German
trade is today more highly politicized than is West German
trade with other communist countries, and its chief aim is
to improve political contacts between the two countries and
to facilitate family reunification and create a more
favorable environment in West Berlin. Although, the East
Germans consider their trade with West Germany as foreign
trade, the West Germans do not consider their trade with
East Germany to be foreign trade, because this would imply
that East Germany would be a legitimate foreign country.
Inter-German trade comes under a special category. Imports
from East Germany are considered "supplies," while exports
are called "deliveries." For political reasons, West
Germany is willing to utilize technology transfer to East
Germany to facilitate greater intra-German contacts. Thus
in considering West German technology transfer policies
toward communist countries, the United States must realize
that intra-German economic relations comes under a unique
6. Interview with Dr. Stephen Bryen, Former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, and Former Director, Defense
Technology and Security Administration, 7 February 1989.
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category. The West German constitution has the right to
export written into it, and West Germans citizens have the
right to sue the government or even the government official
for inhibiting exports. This dispute is still caught up in
the courts, and to date nobody has ever been found guilty of
violating export rules. It is also against the law in West
Germany to extradite, so any illegal exporter who suspects
being caught finds refuge in West Germany. 7
The Soviets realize this and exploit the situation
whenever the opportunity presents itself. West Germany
feels that it has reaped significant concrete results from
its normalization of relations with East Germany. The
Soviet Union is aware that West Germany wishes to continue
to improve its contacts through trade, and will continue to
work the situation to their advantage. 8
D. COCOM AND WEST GERMANY
Hr COCOM is supposed to oversee member countries licensing
and enforcement procedures, which theoretically should all
be the same. Because this organization is an informal
agreement among member nations and is bound by no formal
treaties, each country administers their controls
independently with various degrees of effectiveness.
7. Serge Schmemann, "Angst and Anger in Bonn," New
York Times , 16 January 1989, p. Al
.
8. Yergin, East-West Technology Transfer: European
Perspectives , p. 24.
81
Although all member countries agree on the need for export
controls, the United States is clearly the dominant force in
maintaining tight controls and restricting Soviet access to
Western technology. West Germany, whose reputation speaks
for itself, lacks the political will to improve their laws
or their enforcement efforts to limit technology diversion
to the Soviet Union. It is within this atmosphere that West
Germany balances its relations with the west and its
delicate political and economic ties with East Germany and
the Soviet Union.
The West Germans are willing to trade with the Soviet
bloc to enhance relations with their Eastern neighbors.
Also, West Germany's highly developed industrial economy
places unrestricted trade high on its political agenda.
One-third of all exports goes to the Soviet bloc, and West
Germany sells more goods to the Soviet Union than any other
Western industrialized country. However, because of the
United States and its strong post World War II relationship,
the Germans look at export restrictions as necessary but
difficult to administer. 9 West German participation within
COCOM is clearly inadequate compared to the United States'
effort. West Germany does over five times the trade with
the Soviet Union, yet submits less than half the
9. Robyn S. Metcalfe. The New Wizard War: How The
Soviets Steal U.S. High Technology and How We Give It Away .
Redmond, Washington: Tempus Books of Microsoft Press 1988,
p. 175.
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applications to COCOM than the United States. The amount of
applications submitted by West Germany is clearly under-
represented compared to the amount of trade. It is under
these conditions that Dr. Stephen Bryen says "Any technology




E. WEST GERMAN EXPORT CONTROLS
The West German export controls, although adequate on
paper, in actual operation do little in stopping strategic
technology. The Libyan chemical plant is the recent leak
that has been receiving a lot of media coverage, but this
was not the first time the West Germans were implicated in a
chemical plant transfer. Earlier, West German firms were
linked to the construction of the chemical plant in Iraq
whose products were used in the recent Iraq-Iran war. 11
Export controls over chemical/biological weapons and
munitions are administered directly by the Ministry of
Economics in Bonn. This review is done in coordination with
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. However,
controls over technology transfers and components for
chemical/biological weapons and munitions are administered
by the Economic Ministry's Federal Office for Export
10. Interview with Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, and Former Director, Defense
Technology and Security Administration, 7 February 1989.
11. Timothy Aeppel, "Bonn Reforms Aim to Defuse
Furor," Christian Science Monitor . 21 February 1989, p. 4.
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controls at Frankfurt. There is no coordination with the
Ministries of Defense or Foreign Affairs unless the export
proves controversial. This occurrence allows for the
regular export of components, which would normally be
embargoed, for assembly at some offshore facility. 12
There is also no evidence that West German officials act
on their own to investigate companies. Companies generally
threaten to sue the government if exports are held up.
German law allows for lawsuits to be filled against
individual government officials, thereby decreasing the
likelihood of any official initiative to investigate. The
West German government generally is reactive rather than
proactive in investigating allegations of wrongdoing. "The
Germans have been asked to investigate a considerable number
of cases of alleged illegal diversions of technology and
chemical/biological exports (more than 20) . All responses
revealed no violation of West German law." 13
Mr. Maloof spoke at length, on the inadequacies of the
West German controls on strategic technology.
—West German officials do not conduct pre-license or
post-delivery shipment checks to insure that the
commodities are reaching legitimate end-users.
Consequently a considerable number of exports go through
12. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
13. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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Free World intermediaries, thereby increasing the chances
for illegal diversion.
—West German authorities do not review an item for export
in the context of how it will be incorporated into a total
system. An embargoed system can be exported piecemeal to
various Free World destinations and assembled offshore.
This is contrary to COCOM regulations in the context of
East-West transactions.
--Current German law does not permit a thorough
investigation of company records without a court order.
In turn, a court order cannot be obtained without
substantial evidence that the firm was involved in a
diversion. Consequently, officials will tip off company
officials by inquiring whether it is engaged in that
activity.
—Unlike U.S. export laws, German law lacks a conspiracy
provision. A West German company can order controlled
commodities, technology or chemical precursors, from one
country and have them sent to another country without
touching German soil. Consequently German officials will
not act against the firm, since the activity did not
violate German law.
—West German authorities generally do not require an
import certificate from an importing country to insure the
protection of sensitive exports from illegal diversion.
For example, Swiss authorities may not know to protect a
sensitive item since the West Germans may not request a
Swiss blue import certificate. Invariably, the item is
more likely to be diverted through a Swiss freight
forwarder unbeknownst to anyone. ^^
It is in this light that one can better understand the
recent West German incident with the Libyan chemical plant.
This shows just how easy a diverter, with any kind of
criminal initiative, can obtain and divert strategic
technologies. West Germany is a lucrative target that will
continue to be a weak link within the membership of COCOM.
14. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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F. THE LIBYAN CHEMICAL PLANT INCIDENT
West Germany has been home base for some of the best-
known technology diverters. Because so much trade occurs
between West Germany and the Soviet bloc, and because West
Germany is a highly industrialized nation, technology
smugglers can easily operate without detection. This is
exactly the situation that the Soviet Union will continue to
cultivate. If Gorbachev is able to create the perception of
a less threatening Soviet Union, thereby increasing economic
exports and technology transfer, this will further
exacerbate the already ineffective West German trade
controls. The West German laws and enforcement procedures
are so moderate that technology diverters can operate in
West Germany with impunity. As mentioned earlier, Richard
Mueller and others just like him, hail from West Germany and
many Soviets fronts and warehouses to transship illegal
exports have West German addresses. 15 The most recent
example of the West German inability to control strategic
technology is occurring today with the Libyan chemical
plant. The West German company Imhausen-Chemie played a
central role in the design and construction of the Libyan
chemical plant, which went undetected by the export
controls. 16
15. Metcalfe, The New Wizard War: How The Soviets
Steal U.S. High Technology And How We Give It Away , p. 176.
16. Gary Milhollin, "Bonn's Proliferation Policy," New
York Times . 9 January 1989, p. A-15.
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On 1 January 1989, the United States government, as
reported in the New York Times , reported that five West
German firms were responsible for building the chemical
plant in Rabta, Libya. The report indicated that the West
German firm of Imhausen-Chemie played the central role and
was aided by four other West German firms. In response, the
West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, quickly denied all
allegations and demanded that the United States provide more
evidence to back up its claims. He went on to formally
criticize the administration's handling of the allegations.
In the same article, Imhausen-Chemie strongly denied the
allegations and the examiners from the German Finance
Ministry formally cleared the company of any suspicions that
it exported any chemical equipment or know-how to Libya
between 1984-1988. 17
The West German Chancellor made it seem that this was
the first time he ever heard about the problem, in an effort
to give the appearance that the United States wasn't playing
fair, or that he hadn't had a chance to take positive
action. Further investigation proved that this wasn't so.
Senator John S. McCain III (R-Ariz) , after attending a top-
level military conference said that, "It seems increasingly
apparent that the West German government first denied what
it already knew to be the truth." The U.S. Embassy in West
17. Robert J. McCartney, "W. Germany Assails U.S. on
Libyan Plant; Kohl Government Angered by News Leaks,"
Washington Post . 7 January 1989, p. A-14.
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Germany formally notified the Foreign Minister of U.S.
suspicions of West German corporate involvement in May of
last year. Former Secretary of State George Schultz and CIA
Director William Webster notified Kohl personally on 15
November. 18 Two West German weekly magazines Per Spiegel
and Stern said that the West German authorities knew as
early as two years ago about suspicious West German
participation in the construction of the plant. 19 After
this evidence was revealed, Bonn officials shifted course,
first conceding that the allegations could be right, and
then acknowledging that the West German intelligence service
had provided a report of possible involvement of German
companies as early as October. 20
After all these allegations subsided, the investigation
revealed just how Imhausen was able to build this plant.
Mr. Jurgen Hippenstiel-Imhausen, the managing director of
Imhausen, first made contact with Libya in 1985, and then
used an elaborate false trail through Hong-Kong to outfit
the poison-gas plant at Rabta , Libya. Mr Imhausen himself
is said to have traveled to Hong Kong in November of 1984 to
18. Robert J. McCartney, "Bonn's 'Benign Neglect' On
Poison Gas Assailed," Washington Post , 21 January 1989, p.
A-29.
19. Robert J. McCartney, "Bonn Concedes Libyan Plant
Can Make Chemical Weapons," Washington Post . 17 January
1989, p. A-l.
20. Serge Schmemann, "Letter Indicates More Links
Between Gas-Plant Builders," New York Times , 17 January
1989, p. A-12.
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set up a company called Pen-Tsao-Materia-Medica-Center Ltd.,
and Pen-Tsao in turn authorized Mr. Imhausen to set up a
Hamburg office in April 1987. Imhausen would then formally
sell supplies to Pen-Tsao, which would pretend to ship them
to Hong Kong, and they would end up in Libya. 21 Further
discoveries linked Imhausen's company with I.B.I.
Engineering, owned by an Iraqi businessman Ihsan Barbouti,
who was the principal contractor for the Libyan plant.
Another West German Firm Salzgitter Industriebau or SIG, had
prepared architectural plans for Imhausen, purportedly for a
chemical plant in Hong Kong "Pharma 150," which incidentally
is the same code name for the Libyan plant. 22 West
Germany's giant electronics company Siemens AG has said that
some factory-automation equipment it supplied to Imhausen,
purportedly for the Hong Kong plant, never arrived there. 23
All the evidence compiled and the widening criminal
investigation may have been too much for Mr. Hans-Joachim
21. Serge Schmemann, "In Chemical Maker's Town,
Germans Silently Disbelieve," New York Times . 17 January
1989, p. A-l.
22. Serge Schmemann, "Letter Indicates More Links
Between Gas-Plant Builders," New York Times . 17 January
1989, p. A-12.
23. Robert J. McCartney, "New Evidence Strengthens
Suspicions of Firm's Links to Libya," Washington Post . 1
February 1989, p. A-19.
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Renner the deputy manager of Imhausen-Chemie, second in
charge behind Mr. Imhausen. He tried to commit suicide. 24
As of today the investigation still continues, but the
incident has put considerable strain on West German and U.S.
relations. The United States for years has tried to get the
West Germans to strengthen their export controls. It is the
opinion of the author that the United States was tired of
beating its head against the wall attempting to stop the
technology leak in Germany. Fed up with the West German
foot dragging on this incident, they broke the story in the
papers to prove their point. Senator McCain said,
...the time has come to be frank.... It is becoming a
matter of public record that many West German companies,
and some of the most senior officials and ministers of the
West German government, must have known since the early
1980s that West German firms were contributing to the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. 25
This Libyan controversy is widely seen as the most
politically damaging episode ever faced by the government of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl.
G. WEST GERMANY'S PROPOSED REFORMS
As a result of this incident, Chancellor Kohl is
introducing a package of reforms aimed at tightening export
controls and stemming West Germany's image as a chemical
24. Serge Schmemann, "German Whose Company is Tied to
Libya Apparently Tries Suicide," New York Times . 18 February
1989, p. A-2.
25. McCartney, "Bonn's 'Benign Neglect' On Poison Gas
Assailed," p. A-29.
90
weapons salesman. The new system outlined will strengthen
export controls, ranging from stiffer penalties for those
circumventing the law to a better system of monitoring
exports. In addition their export administration staff
which monitors sensitive export will be nearly tripled, and
a new export control division will be created in the
Economics Ministry in Bonn. All these measures are aimed
not just at chemicals, but for other arms-related
technologies as well. 26 Mr. Maloof feels that the proposed
changes will center only on chemical and biological exports
and not on enhanced protection of sensitive technology
transfers. In any event, this bill has yet to be endorsed
by the West German Parliament, whose political orientation
puts a premium on keeping exports as free of restrictions as
possible. It Is projected that the West German Parliament
may not act on these recommendations until late spring. Yet
West Germany remains the greatest single source of illegal
transfers of sensitive technology to the Warsaw Pact. 27
One thing that can be counted upon is that any attempt to
limit the constitutional right to export will meet
resistance from powerful export-oriented industries, and
this is the string the Soviets will continue to pull.
26. Aeppel, "Bonn Reforms Aim to Defuse Furor," p. 4.
27. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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H. THE DOMINANCE OF THE ECONOMICS MINISTRY
The United States is pleased that the West Germans are
making progress in attempting to control exports. Any
movement towards strong controls is welcomed by the United
States , who feels that other countries with weak controls
should emulate the West German initiatives. However, in
every category that West Germany is proposing to strengthen,
the United States remains far superior. The biggest
fundamental difference is that the United States system is
not administered by any one agency. In the United States,
three branches of government—Commerce, Defense and the
State Department—act as a balance to each other in
administering the system. While there is an attempt at
improving the West German system, it will still be regulated
by the Economics Ministry, which is primarily charged with
promoting and not restricting trade.
It is in the United States' best interest that controls
continue to improve within West Germany. West Germany's
technology base, demonstrated political will to trade with
the Soviet bloc and inability to control strategic
technology exports, make them prime targets for the Soviet
Union's acquisition methods. The effort that Gorbachev is
placing on making the Soviet Union appear less threatening
is an attempt to ease COCOM restrictions which are motivated
by the United States. Gorbachev will continue this effort
to encourage Western companies to bring high-quality,
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technology-based products and know-how into the Soviet
economy. West Germany is now, and will be in the future, a
well sought-after technological market by the Soviet Union.
I. THE COCOM LISTS
In taking a further look at the West German political
will to enforce COCOM regulations, and the differences the
future might bring should these proposed laws go into
effect, one must look at the past. Within COCOM there are
three lists: (1) the munitions list that includes all
military items, (2) the atomic list, including sources of
fissionable material and their components, and (3) the
industrial/commercial or dual-use list. Supposedly, the
first two lists receive little argument among COCOM
membership which agrees that all items on the first two
lists need to be controlled for obvious reasons. It is the
dual-use list that receives all the attention and argument.
However, West Germany cannot even control items from the
nuclear fissionable materials list, a matter that was
explicitly agreed upon by the entire membership of COCOM.
From 1985 to about 1987 a West German firm "Neue
Technologien, " used a front company to export an entire
factory to Pakistan to help process uranium for bombs, plus
tritium and tritium-making equipment to multiply the
explosive power of Pakistan's first generation nuclear
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bombs. 28 In 1984 the West German firm, Degussa, exported to
India the metal beryllium, which is a reflector material
that enhances the explosive power of atomic bombs. The
export application was legally approved by West German
authorities. 29 These exports are not only forbidden under
COCOM regulations, but under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty that West Germany pledged to uphold. These are only
two of many illegal exports that the United States attempted
to stop earlier. 30
J. THE ABSENCE OF A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE
Exports such as the ones explained above only indicate
what is well known among U.S. officials responsible for
controlling strategic technology. It is evident that West
Germany has little if any national security/military input
or perspective in any export transaction. It is apparent
that they feel, because an item falls under the dual-use
category , that it won't be used for military means. This is
a naive judgement on their part from a national security
perspective, but the emphasis in West Germany is on exports
and that's where the political priority seems to be. This
seems ironic because the West Germans are the largest
28. Michael R. Gordon, "German Concern Said to Aid
Pakistan A-Weapons," New York Times . 29 January 1989, p. A-
6.
29. Stephen Engelberg, "German Atomic Sale
Challenged," New York Times , 1 February 1989, p. A-2
.
30. Milhollin, "Bonn's Proliferation Policy," p. A-15.
94
contributor to NATO behind the United States. It would seem
that because of this contribution, they would coordinate
their exports, or at least solicit recommendations from
their defense sector. It is the defense sector that has the
most to lose should their present political/economic
strategy fail. The computer technology that leaks to the
east today, may return in the form of Soviet missile
guidance systems that will have to be dealt with tomorrow.
The irony of the situation came full circle with the latest
public West German incident, which is an explicit example of
the lack of any rational defensive perspective whatsoever.
William Webster, the Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, reported that the West Germans may have helped
Libya develop an air-to-air refueling capability that will
significantly extend the range of Libya's bombers. 31 Not
only will Col. Qaddafi be able to strike Israel, but also
numerous other countries and cities in the area. It is
ironic that the West Germans, who were victimized by
terrorists in Munich during the Olympic games, are selling
the required products and building a chemical weapons
production plant for a known terrorist, Col. Maummer
Qaddafi. They are giving him the capability to use the
chemical weapons against themselves and their allies by
giving him an air-to-air refueling capability that
31. Stephen Engelberg, "Libyans Reported to Opt For
Drugs," New York Times . 2 March 1989, p. A-4
.
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significantly increases his range. This is clearly not a
rational response for anyone with any kind of national
security perspective, unless the West Germans have an
entirely different opinion of Col. Qaddafi than the rest of
the members of COCOM. In any event, the transaction still
should have been submitted to COCOM for review.
It is this sort of attitude of maintaining exports free
of restrictions that the Soviets strive to encourage. By
using their agents of influence, the Soviets will play on
the political issues within West Germany in order to
maintain their access to West German technology. Gorbachev,
through his declared policies of "perestroika" and
"glasnost , " is making the Soviets appear less hostile in an
attempt to loosen Western export controls and create new
business ties. There is a willingness on his part to make
token concessions regarding dissidents, relaxation of
cultural and artistic rules, and easing of media controls,
in order to produce more joint ventures and turn-key
operations that have an immediate effect on the Soviet
economy. Their recent effort to bring high-quality
technology and know-how into their economy is their newest
joint ventures rules issued in early 1987. These rules
allow foreign investment partners to own as much as 49
percent of the joint venture. The Soviets are now letting
Western countries take out their profits in hard currency if
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the joint venture produces earning' s in foreign trade. 32
West Germany is a target for these good will gestures, and
their political/economic situation with the Eastern bloc,
sways the advantage to the Soviets. In January 1988, Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Schevardnadze went to Bonn to
encourage the West Germans to ease its exports restrictions
of sensitive technology, something the Germans have been
doing for some time. Of course the Soviets emphasized the
close link between arms cuts and their economic reforms to
give the appearance of being less threatening to further
encourage help from the West Germans. 33
Should Gorbachev succeed at convincing the West Germans
to invest more in the Soviet bloc and to commit to these
joint venture partnerships, then the flow of technology will
continue to increase regardless of these recent initiatives
the Germans are making. If the economic perspective remains
the top priority in West Germany, the ability to maintain
technological superiority over eastern bloc forces, a
strategy that has been key in NATO force structure, will be
in jeopardy. To make export decisions on dual-use
technology, which implies a distinctive military application
in the definition, without considering the strategic
32. Metcalfe, The New Wizard War; How the Soviets
Steal U.S. High Technology And How We Give It Away , p. 29.
33. Elizabeth Pond, "In Bonn, Shevardnadze Pushes Arms
Cuts," Christian Science Monitor , 20 January 1988, p. 7.
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military implications, will not be in the best interest of
the Western world.
The primary problem concerning the technology issue
between the United States and West Germany revolves around
their security relationship and the defense budget.
Although West Germany is the second largest contributor to
NATO, behind the United States, their defense budget is
significantly smaller than that of the United States. The
country which has the most to lose through technology
transfer is the United States and consequently that is why
they push the issue. If the defense budget of West Germany
were as large as that of the United States, their
perspective would change. The United States views the dual-
use argument from a defensive perspective, the Germans see
it from an economic perspective. As with Japan, the United
States feels that Germany is taking advantage of its defense
establishment, while West Germany feels that the U.S. is
trying to restrict trade to give the U.S. exporter some sort
of advantage. Until the United States shifts more of the
defense burden to them, they will continue to view the
situation in this manner and the Soviets will continue to
take advantage of the situation. These next few years are
crucial, because the thrust of the technology transfer issue
will be increasingly important in 1992. With the projected
economic unification of Europe, which diminishes the U.S.
role on that continent, the United States may not have a leg
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to stand on regarding technology transfer. To redistribute
the burden now may generate a defensive perspective that
will continue on into the future.
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VI. EXPORT CONTROLS AND FOUR OTHER MEMBERS OF COCOM
Among the other members of COCOM there are four other
countries which are important when evaluating technology
transfer. By looking at the United States, Britain, France
and Italy in this chapter, one may be able to draw further
conclusions about each member's degree of participation.
Everyone says they agree on the need to control strategic
technology to the Soviet Union, yet in reality some
countries just give this lip-service. By looking at these
other four members and comparing them to Japan and West
Germany, we can draw some conclusions regarding the
previously stated propositions.
\(\ A. UNITED STATES
Examining the history of export controls in the United
States is basically the mirror image of Chapter II and the
history of COCOM. Since the organization's inception,
almost all initiatives to control technology have been
spearheaded by the United States. These American
initiatives in the multilateral forum have their roots in
U.S. domestic policy. With the rare exception of England
and France, the United States leads all member countries in
maintaining the initiative and control over strategic
Western technologies. This was the case in 1949 after the
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establishment of COCOM, and it is still the case today. 1
Over the years, concern over technology transfer received
varying degrees of initiative from the United States. The
current concern over strategic technology transfer began in
the 197 0s during the period of detente between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This concern came about due to
two specific developments in U.S. -Soviet relations.
The first was the increased reliability on conventional
weapons in as era of nuclear arms reduction talks. With
changes in the nuclear balance, our previous strategies
which depended on our nuclear arsenal no longer provided a
credible deterrent. This put an increased emphasis on
conventional weapons. These armaments require a broad
spectrum of available technologies, many of them applicable
in the commercial/industrial sector. These technologies
known as "dual-use," are important to the Western world in
order to maintain a qualitative advantage over the
quantitative superior Soviet conventional forces. Thus
qualitatively superior weapons emerged as a critical
national interest. 2
The second was American disillusionment with Soviet
behavior during the era of detente. The incentives that
1. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
2. Vitalij Garber, "The Evolution of Tighter U.S.
Export Controls," in: Perry and Pfaltzgraff, Selling the
Rope to Hang Capitalism? , p. 182.
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were proffered as a part of the policy of detente,
"carrots," did not produce the hoped-for results. Attempts
to increase Western leverage over Soviet actions by drawing
the Soviet Union into a fairly liberal trade regime and
technology transfer program failed. A contrary result
became apparent. The Soviets had been able to save
considerable expenditures of money and research effort in
the implementation of their military programs, the pace of
which— in spite of detente—continued unabated. 3 For
example, three sales were made during the 1970 f s. All three
of them legal at the time and all three approved with the
understanding that the items would be put only to civilian
use.
—The first was the sale of $1.5 billion worth of U.S. and
other Western technology that allowed the Soviets to build
the KAMA river truck plant in the early 1970s. The
factory produced large number of military trucks that were
used in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and by Soviet
military units in Eastern Europe opposite NATO forces.
—The second unfortunate sale consisted of U.S. precision
grinding machines for the production of small, high
precision bearings that proved useful to Soviet missile
designers. This directly benefitted the Soviet Strategic
Rocket Forces who maintain the ICBM's that are pointed at
the United States.
—The third sale consisted of two large floating drydocks
that were sold to the Soviet Union in 1978 and diverted
shortly thereafter to military use. Such drydocks are of
critical importance for the repair of ships damaged in
warfare, and each of those sold can carry several naval
vessels. They have been used over the years to service
3. Garber, "The Evolution of Tighter U.S. Export
Controls," p. 183.
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KIEV class aircraft carriers, destroyers, and submarines
carrying ballistic missiles. 4
It is because of the above mentioned reasons, coupled
with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, that ended this
period of detente with virtually all trade in high
technology with the Soviet bloc terminated. In order to
better administer and control the American export system, as
well as monitor the Soviet acquisitions world-wide, the
Defense Technology and Security Administration was
developed. This organization developed under the Reagan
administration, and punctuated the renewed American
commitment to control strategic technology leakage.
B. AMERICAN LEAKAGE
As mentioned earlier, no-country is immune to the
massive Soviet effort to acquire Western technology. One of
the prerequisites of the whole process is to be a generator,
or in possession of the technology needed by the Soviet
Union. Because of the United States' technological
proficiency, which in terms of defense contractors
represents well over 100 industries, the Soviet effort
within the United States is enormous. 5 Because of this
4. Allan Wendt, "U.S. Export Control Policy: Its
Present and Future Course," Current Policy . No. 1094, United
States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs,
Washington D.C., 14 June 1988, p. 1.
5. Central Intelligence Agency, "Soviet Acquisition of
Military Significant Western Technology: An Update," pp.
18-23.
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technological proficiency, the United States is not without
its disappointments. Various diversions have resulted in
more than 190 indictments since 1981, well documented by the
Department of Justice.
Between 1977 and 1980, Werner Bruchhausen smuggled more
than $8 million worth of high technology and military
equipment through various front companies in California to
other from companies in Europe and on to Soviet customers.
Bruchhausen owned and controlled at least 12 corporations in
California and two in West Germany. His operation was based
primarily in Southern California, and with the help of three
accomplices became firmly established in the illegal
business of selling strategic technologies to the Soviets.
Bruchhausen ran one of the most successful supply routes
of U.S. high technology to the Soviet Union in the late
1970s, using his offices in California and Germany to export
equipment to both the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc
customers. Although he specialized in finding semiconductor
manufacturing equipment for the Soviets, he also assisted
them in acquiring electronic testing equipment,
communications systems, computers, and computer components.
By the time Bruchhausen was apprehended, the Soviets had
received Data General Eclipse computers, Fairchild test
equipment, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, antenna
equipment, microwave tuners, Memorex disk drives, Intel
single-board computers, and Motorola microcircuits
.
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Although the equipment was worth only about $8 million in
the United States, eager Soviets had parted with at least
$30 million of their precious hard currency. The Soviet
purchases often came in pairs, one for the purpose of
reverse engineering, and another for use in military general
scientific research, or industrial applications. 6
In another embarrassment mentioned in Chapter III,
former naval warrant officer John Walker and his family
operated without detection for 17 years before being
captured. The magnitude of his diversions will be felt for
many years to come, and possibly jeopardized American
serviceman's lives as far back as the Vietnam era. Mr
Walker's diversion of military technical manuals to secure
voice encoding devices, along with keying material, allowed
the Soviet Union to manufacture the same machines to decode
secure voice transmissions. As indicated earlier, this
compromise had devastating implications on the United
States. 7
The United States hasn't been immune to illegal Chemical
diversion either. An Iranian diplomat stationed in West
Germany arranged three shipments in 1987 and 1988 of
6. Metcalfe, The New Wizard War: How the Soviets Steal
U.S. High Technology, and How We Give It Away , pp. 2-3.
7. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, Permanent Sub-Committee on Investigations, Foreign
Missions Act on Espionage Activities in the United States
,
Hearings, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986,
p. 103. Also, Barron, Breaking the Ring , p. 148.
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chemicals to make mustard gas. The diplomat directed a West
German company, Chemco G.m.b.h. , to buy chemicals from
Alcolac International of Baltimore. The shipments were
routed through companies in Greece and Singapore to conceal
their true destination. Alcolac officials said that the
chemicals had been sent to Iran without their knowledge.
Under American law, export of the specific chemicals
involved anywhere require an export license, and shipments
to Iran, Iraq and Syria are barred.
During the investigation, an official of the German firm
who was an accomplice for the Iranian diplomat was caught an
arrested in the United States. He later pleaded guilty to
violating American export law. That official, Peter
Walaschek, at first agreed to cooperate with prosecutors by
wearing a hidden microphone as an informant for the Customs
service. But on 1 December he fled the country and flew to
West Germany, forfeiting his $350,000 bond. The man remains
free in West Germany because a spokesman at the embassy in
Washington said Mr. Walaschek could not be charged with any
violations of German law, because the transactions had taken
place outside the country. They also said that Mr.
Walaschek cannot be forced to return to the United States
for trial because German law does not provide for
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extradition. 8 This is a recent example of the points made
about West Germany in Chapter V.
C. FUNCTION OF TECHNICAL PROFICIENCY, AND U.S. ENFORCEMENT
As long as the United States remains a technologically
proficient nation, illegal diversion will occur by
incorrigible adversaries from various nations, particularly
the Soviet Union. The United States realizes this and is
leading the Western response with various initiatives, some
of which were explained in Chapter II. All legislation,
enforcement efforts, and private initiatives that the United
States has brought into the multilateral forum in COCOM,
have been implemented in some form here in the United
States. As said before, the United States leads and
maintains the initiative in controlling strategic dual-use
technology throughout the Western world. At the forefront
of these U.S. initiatives is its own domestic export
processes, export regulations, and sanctions against
violators that are unparalleled in the Western world.
The Libyan chemical plant incident in the case of West
Germany, and the Toshiba incident in the case of Japan, show
where the interests of the U.S. government and the U.S.
exporter converge, contrary to the other members of COCOM.
National security demands tighter technology security
8. Michael R. Gordon, "Iran is Expanding Chemical
Stocks Used In Poison Gas: Embassy in Bonn is Key," New
York Times , 19 January 1989, p. A-l.
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throughout the Western alliance. COCOM nations vary in
their approach in attacking the problem, and none come close
to the American effort. For example, the United States
assigns several hundreds of officials throughout the
Departments of State, Commerce and Defense (over 750) , to
review license applications and to enforce export control
regulations. The United States Export Administration Act of
1985 punishes violators of these regulations with prison
terms of up to ten years. The Department of Defense, which
has the biggest stake in the success of export controls,
plays a vigorous role in U.S. government policy making. The
Defense Technology and Security Administration reviews all
proposed sales of exports of controlled goods to the Soviet
bloc and can raise its objections to the President of the
United States. By contrast, German and Japanese defense
agencies played no role whatsoever in the recent incidents
described in the previous chapters. 9
The most lopsided statistic is in the key area of
enforcement of a country's existing export regulations,
where the United States is also in the lead. Since 1981 the
United States has indicted approximately 192 cases for
violation of export regulations and other related offenses.
Out of these cases, numerous individuals have been found
guilty and are serving prison sentences or paying millions
9. Stephen D. Bryen, "Forward" to Metacalfe, The New
Wizard War: How the Soviets Steal U.S. High Technology and
How We Give It Away , p. 10.
108
of dollars in fines, or both. 10 In contrast, Mr. Maloof
says that,
...compared to the United States, there have been almost
no prosecutions in COCOM countries for violations of
export laws. Japan took Toshiba Marine officials to
trial, found them guilty and gave them a suspended
sentence. Norway just put Bernard Green behind bars for
two years, but these were real high visibility cases, and
that is about all there has ever been. 11
This is just one of the many examples of the lack of
reciprocity among the membership of COCOM. It also shows
the inequity toward the U.S. exporter, who is forced to
comply with the law, unlike his counterparts in other member
nations of COCOM. This is also why Western security is
jeopardized, because the Soviets will take the path of least
resistance to acquire whatever technology they need. Any
unilateral decisions to control specific technologies will
be ineffective, if the Soviets can go to the next country to
acquire what they need with less resistance. This situation
gets increasingly more complicated as technology moves
outside the membership of COCOM.
D. GREAT BRITAIN
Britain, like all Western countries, has hosted various
smugglers who have used the country as a way station for
10. Export Control Enforcement Unit, Internal Security
Section, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
"Significant Export Control Cases, January 1, 1981 to
January 23, 1989."
11. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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Western technology bound for the Soviet Union. One of the
most recent British citizens, Brian Butcher, a second-hand
electronics dealer and convicted "technobandit, " is suing
his government to protect him from American export controls.
The British government is opposing Butcher in the British
High Court and is very proud of its record against export
violators. 12
Britain, whose technology base is substantial, but less
than the United States, Japan or West Germany, is considered
one of the most conscientious Western European countries
among the membership of COCOM. When asked about the British
technology controls, Dr. Stephen Bryen says, "The British
controls are similar to ours, they act very responsibly in
transferring technology to the Soviet bloc." Dr. Bryen went
on to say that "the United States and British license
submissions to COCOM are the only ones that are anywhere
near reality, compared to the amount of trade with the
Soviet bloc." 13 Mr. Maloof says that "Britain is one of the
rare allies that make proposals to add to the COCOM control
list, instead of the other member nations, who are
constantly asking to reduce the items on the control
12. Pamela Sherrid, "Tackling the Technobandit at Lower
Cost," U.S. News & World Report . 1 February 1988, p. 36.
13. Interview with Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, and Former Director, Defense
Technology and Security Administration, 7 February 1989.
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list." 14 In general, Great Britain takes a similar stance
as the United States, as to the importance of controlling
strategic technology. The British administer their program
accordingly.
E. FRENCH CONTROLS
The French take a middle-of-the-road stand on technology
transfer. France openly criticizes Soviet political and
economic policy but is willing both to trade with the
Eastern bloc and to subsidize interest rates on loans to
those countries. Still, France cooperates with the United
States in restricting higher technology exports, and shares
the U.S. commitment to keeping strategic and military
critical equipment out of Soviet hands. In 1981, the French
government under President Francois Mitterrand, created a
commission for the protection of its own advanced
technologies. France monitors its own licensing procedures
on high-technology exports and also audits U.S. goods that
arrive in their country. Still, because compliance with
COCOM rules is voluntary, France sometimes removes items
from COCOM consideration and acts independently. 15
France was implicated in the Toshiba incident through
accusations by both Norway and Japan. They accused the
14. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
15. Metcalfe, The New Wizard War: How the Soviets
Steal U.S. High Technology and How We Give It Away , p. 176.
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French firm of Ratier-Forest of sending machine-tools to the
Soviet Union prior to the Toshiba transaction, but the
company went bankrupt before the French investigation could
come to any conclusions. 16 In April, four men were arrested
for breaking a French counterespionage law even though their
crime involved illegal shipments rather than spying. A
French machine-tool manufacturer sold machinery used to
produce turbine blades for jet engines. The French
government's use of the counter-espionage statute instead of
a lessor export charge was meant to send a message to the
United States of the increased French effort to enforce
COCOM agreements. 17
Prior to President Mitterrand's election, France was
considered a legendary haven for spies. In 198 3, France
expelled 47 Soviet spies in an unprecedented act in Franco-
Soviet relations. France said there was extensive evidence
of widespread scientific and technological espionage,
particularly in the military field. 18 This housecleaning
effort sent the message to Moscow that France could no
longer be counted on to look the other way.
16. E.S. Browning, "Illicit Sales Made to Soviets by
French Firm," Wall Street Journal . 19 October 1987, p. 27.
17. E.S. Browning, "Four Executives in France Are
Arrested for Exports of Technology to the Soviets," Wall
Street Journal . 25 April 1988, p. 23.
18. Margaret Murray, "Real Goal of Soviets' Global Spy
Network," U.S. News & World Report , 18 April 1983, ps. 31-
32.
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Dr. Bryen seemed fairly optimistic about the French
effort, which may have been a relative assessment when
viewed in the context of other members' control efforts.
When asked about the French export controls, his reply was
"up and down." Since the election of President Mitterrand
in 1981, the French have made good improvement in their
export controls, but just recently they may be slipping
some." When asked about this recent decline, his reply was,
"because defense is playing a lessor role in the decision
making process. In France, specifically General Henri Conze
was a key player and influence in strengthening control of
technology exports to the Soviet Union." 19 Mr. Maloof
indicated that there was a growing concern in France that
President Mitterrand is under pressure from the Interior
Minister to open up trade with the Soviet Union in order to
take advantage of the economic opportunities, which
conflicts with their previous hardline. 20 Both interviews
led me to believe that although France occasionally acts
independently, it was not an immediate area of concern for
stopping strategic technology moving east.
19. Interview with Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, and Former Director, Defense
Technology and Security Administration, 7 February 1989.
20. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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F. ITALIAN CONTROLS
There is not too much published in the open literature
on Italian capabilities to control strategic technology. In
every interview I conducted though, when asked how Italian
controls were, everyone replied "suspect." Dr. Bryen,
however, was a little more adamant.
Italy is a sieve. Bigger companies that have a large
international reputation are pretty responsible because
they have a lot to lose in the world market, like Fiat.
But the smaller companies that are on the fence are really
suspect. Generally speaking in Italy, the smaller the
company the greater the risk of illegal technology
exports. 21
Mr. Maloof added that "Some corporations in countries that
have a large or significant communist party, don't even
submit transactions to COCOM. They export straight to the
Soviet bloc, due to the influence of the indigenous
communist party. Moscow will give kickbacks and increased
funding to these parties for completed transactions." Mr.
Maloof made it clear that Italy was not the only country
where this sort of thing went on. 22
From the information described in this and previous
chapters, one can draw some correlations about the various
countries that contribute to the flow of strategic
technology to the Soviet bloc. There are trends and
21. Interview with Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, and Former Director, Defense
Technology and Security Administration, 7 February 1989.
22. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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reoccurring situations that occur within the membership of
COCOM, that in the opinion of the author, lead to some
inescapable conclusions. Unless these situations are
corrected, technology will continue to flow east.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Chapter I, I put forth eight propositions that are
useful in explaining the flow of strategic "dual-use"
technology to the Soviet Union. By giving the reader some
background on Soviet acquisition methods, history of COCOM
and recent performances of some of the biggest
technologically proficient nations, one can tie these
propositions into each country's performance, to identify
weaknesses and future priorities within the membership. If
the COCOM membership concentrated on these weaknesses, in
order to strengthen the organization equally across the
board, this would provide a stronger united front to meet
the Soviet acquisition effort directly.
Should the Western alliance agree to strengthen their
controls in the areas identified, this will have an
immediate effect on Western security and readiness,
especially in an era of nuclear arms reductions. The
Western alliance would also be in a better position to
negotiate with Gorbachev from a position of strength. By
improving the control over their strategic technology and
thereby denying the Soviets unauthorized access, the Western
alliance would be able to better strike a balance in
strategic trade, to ensure Gorbachev succeeds with his
economic reforms without jeopardizing Western security. By
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the membership of COCOM maintaining strong control, it would
increase the likelihood of inducing change in the Soviet
Union, ensuring that Gorbachev remains in power and nudge or
encourage democratic reform.
Even with all the stirring of "glasnost," and economic
reform within the Soviet Union, all initiatives to date have
not resulted in any redirection of resources away from the
Soviet military machine. It is unanimously agreed upon
throughout the Western world that it is hard to find fault
in Gorbachev's rhetoric. By taking a united stance on
strategic "dual-use" technology transfer, COCOM and the
Western alliance could induce change and be far more
reassured by supporting Soviet actions. COCOM membership
could start by improving in the following areas, which in
the opinion of the author are its greatest vulnerabilities.
A. PROPOSITION 1—THE INFORMAL NATURE OF COCOM ITSELF
Although COCOM was formed during the same time period as
NATO, with the same assumption that the Western alliance
faces a serious threat from the Soviet bloc, COCOM remains a
semi-secret organization. This organization remains
virtually unknown to the general populations throughout the
membership of COCOM. This is the result of some members of
COCOM, who agree on the need for export controls, but find
that open support of the organization to be too politically
sensitive. This is why COCOM doesn't operate under a
specific treaty or charter that mandates compliance.
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These same countries who are unable to publicly
acknowledge their participation in COCOM remove export
requests from COCOM consideration or just refrain from
submitting the export application altogether, because the
sale in question is to economically attractive. Yet, it is
also these same countries who view adverse publicity, such
as that received by Japan during the Toshiba incident and
publicity received by West Germany during the Libyan
Chemical plant incident, as counter-productive to their
efforts to exert effective control. In the opinion of the
author this viewpoint is absurd. The reason the media got
involved in the first place is due to. the specific country's
negligence and failure to respond once confronted by the
situation. Had the countries involved better administered
the controls they agreed to enforce the incidents wouldn't
have happened in the first place.
In general, the informal nature of the system gives the
individual country involved enormous leeway to administer
their specific export requirements as they see fit. The
problem comes about when this informal agreement directly
impacts on their formal agreements, such as the NATO treaty.
The nature of "dual-use" technology which specifically
implies a military significance has a direct correlation to
NATO readiness. This informal nature allows the
economically-oriented countries such as West Germany and
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Japan to export "dual-use" technologies without addressing
their military implications.
1. Recommendations
Improve public awareness. This would benefit in two
ways.
1. Increase the cost or repercussions that would be
rendered on a company seeking to make a quick profit
by illegally trading with the Soviet Union and
reducing national security. The company would
jeopardize its reputation by circumventing export
rules thereby making the sale to costly. As mentioned
earlier by Dr. Bryen, in Italy the larger companies
with the international reputations are pretty
responsible, it's the smaller ones that are suspect.
2. This would make a formalized treaty between the member
nations of COCOM more politically appealing. By
educating the public on Soviet operations and the
implications of technology transfer, public opinion
could be mobilized in the West to make it politically
appealing to formally control "dual-use" exports.
An initiative to revitalize COCOM by Ambassador
Allen Wendt was based on improved public understanding of
COCOM objectives and a common standard level of effective
protection for all exports of controlled strategic
commodities. He said,
...our general public does not know very much about our
export program, especially its purpose and specific
objectives. The only time people hear about export
controls is when the media cover some spectacular illegal
sale or diversion of sensitive equipment. It is ironic
that the Soviets may be far better informed about our
control system that is the U.S. public.
This is a situation that is not unique to the United
States. We believe there should be increased public
awareness of the purpose and goals of our control system
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and COCOM. I can tell you this is a sensitive subject
with some of our COCOM partners. 1
If this initiative can be implemented both within
the United States and among the membership of COCOM, the
general public may support a stronger policy of denying
sensitive technology to the Soviet Union. The policy of
treating COCOM as a semi-secret organization has effectively
worked against building public support for COCOM.
B. PROPOSITION 2—THE BIGGEST LEAKERS HAVE A MORE COMMER-
CIAL ORIENTATION THAN OTHER COUNTRIES
This may be somewhat self-induced, since following World
War II, the United States was responsible for the Japanese
system of government and partially responsible for the West
German system. These two countries were both reconstructed
with the United States playing the dominant role in
providing the national security, while each country picked
up the pieces economically also with help from the United
States. From this came the system that exists today, where
the United States plays the dominant role in both NATO and
the United States/Japanese security treaty.
It shouldn't surprise anyone that the commercial/
economic perspective will play the biggest role within
international relations of countries that have this luxury.
How can the United States expect any conscientious export
1. Allen Wendt, "Export Control Policy and COCOM,"
Current Policy No. 1031 . United States Department of State,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C., 19 November 1987,
p. 2 .
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control system that's charged with monitoring strategic
trade to work, when the bureaucracy designed to do so,
bypasses anyone qualified enough to identify the export as
strategic? As mentioned earlier both the West German and
the Japanese systems do just that.
When these countries send representatives to the COCOM
negotiations, their representatives come from the commercial
sector who seek to benefit from the most lax control list
possible. It becomes very difficult to explain the
strategic reasoning for controlling the export to a
representative that thinks in only dollars and cents. These
representatives come from the exact industries that the
United States is seeking to control. 2
Technology control, although extremely important, is
handled at a very low level in COCOM governments. The
priority is toward increasing sales and the benefits of
controlling strategic exports are not realized. "Defense
budgets could be cut in half, but the allies won't adjust to
this because they don't spend much on defense." 3 This
commercial orientation puts a heavy strain on the
negotiation process within COCOM. Mr. Maloof says,
2. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
3. Interview with Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, and Former Director, Defense
Technology and Security Administration, 7 February 1989.
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...with the exception of Great Britain and France, COCOM
allies very rarely come with a proposal to add to the
list. The amount of decontrol proposals are completely
out of hand. There is a big push to diminish the list to
as few items as possible, wholesale decontrol with no
strategic rational. 4
This perspective will continue to be dominant in countries
where industry and business executives think only in the
commercial/economic benefits of doing business with the
Soviet Union and not on the national security repercussions.
1. Recommendations
There needs to be an increased education effort
implemented to inform all industry officials of the national
security implications of doing business with the Soviet
bloc. This is especially necessary since Gorbachev is
allowing Soviet representatives to deal directly with these
industries. Corporations have to be made to realize that it
is their obligation to do their part to control their
strategic technology. They also should be made aware of the
fact that any innovation that makes its way East will most
likely be used to improve the Soviet military industrial
complex.
Once this effort is complete and specific
technologies are identified, COCOM should concentrate on
those items with a clear and concise enforcement effort,
unrelated to foreign policy. When the United States mixes
4. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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their foreign policy concerns with technology transfer, the
allies don't buy it. The allies feel that immigration and
human rights are totally unrelated to the export of
strategic technology. 5 By identifying the very critical
items and maintaining a coherent policy in the technology
transfer area, this will have a solidifying effect among the
membership of COCOM.
C. PROPOSITION 3—A TOTAL LACK OF ANY NATIONAL SECURITY OR
MILITARY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE OR OPINION WHEN CONDUCTING
EXPORT TRANSACTIONS
This problem is directly related to the previous, where
a national security perspective is completely cut out of the
loop, such as in the case of Japan and West Germany.
Earlier, in the case of France, Mr. Bryen mentioned that the
reason for the improvement of French controls was because of
the influence of a certain general. In the United States as
well as Great Britain the military point of view gets equal
time with the commercial/economic perspective in the
formulation of export policy. The term "dual-use"
specifically infers a military application in its
definition. Yet, a military perspective on the
repercussions of selling a strategic technology is not
addressed in either Japan or West Germany.
5. Interview between Mr. Dan Hoydysh, Director, Office
of Technology and Policy Analysis, Department of Commerce,
and the author, 8 February 1989.
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With the rare exception of Great Britain and France, the
United States is the only country that comes into COCOM
negotiations with the strategic criteria to maintain certain
control limits over Soviet targeted technology and
commodities. The allies, again with the exception of U.K.
and France, do not provide strategic justification either to
decontrol a technology or to lift the technical limits of
that strategic technology or commodity. 6
Despite the effort of the United States to get
Ministries of Defense more involved into COCOM affairs,
Ministries of Trade are the predominant voice in formulating
most allied countries strategic control lists. Mr. Maloof
is very adamant when he says,
Except to the U.K. and France, defense has little if any
influence in formulating individual member control
policies. We are always on the defensive in these
negotiations, defending our position for maintaining
stronger controls. The U.S. defensive umbrella is a way
of life, a luxury. 7
1 . Recommendations
As mentioned before in the previous two problems,
the key needs to be education, both for the general
population and the corporations. With this education, the
benefits of having a national security perspective cut into
6. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
7. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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the decision making loop should be readily apparent. As it
stands right now, the countries who already have this
national security input are at an extreme disadvantage, both
from the military perspective and the commercial/economic
perspective. If an ally sells a particular technology it
affects the national security of the entire alliance. Yet,
this same sale would not be approved by any country within
the alliance that maintains a military input. This shows
that the country who obeys the law is unfairly treated.
D. PROPOSITION 4—THE SPECIFIC COUNTRY'S POLITICAL WILL
AND PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT
This is the most important concept in controlling
strategic technology. As mentioned earlier, West Germany,
who views itself as a divided nation with East Germany, is
not likely to take as hard a stand on strategic technology
transfer for reasons previously discussed. Japan, who has
enjoyed enormous economic success since World War II, finds
it very hard politically to control trade and exports, when
trade and exports are the foundation of their success.
Gorbachev and the Soviet Union have played on these various
issues within each country to give the Soviet Union a less
threatening appearance.
Along with each country's perception of the threat, come
their visa policies. The allies are letting an increasing
amount of Eastern bloc nationals into their country. The
volume of approved visas has far outstripped the ability of
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the system to review applications. Approvals are out of
control, without any COCOM control. "East bloc nationals
are granted a visa to look at a shoe lace factory only to be
found where they weren't supposed to be." 8 This allows East
bloc nationals access to Western technology, without COCOM
approval. The consequences of this policy apparently aren't
considered by the allies or their perception of this threat
appears to be minimal.
1 . Recommendation
In order to take advantage of decreasing political
will among some allies, tie export controls to arms control
negotiations. If the United States and the West are
politically forced to reduce their military capability, in
the era of anti-nuclear sentiment and arms reduction
agreements, then tie it into increased and stronger "dual-
use" strategic technology export controls.
The more arms-control agreements that are signed,
the more imperative "dual-use" technology controls become.
As mentioned before, "dual-use" technologies are directly
related to improving conventional arms, which the Soviet
Union have the distinct advantage in quantity. To improve
the Soviet quality of these conventional army by lax export
controls would be criminal.
8. Interview with Mr. Michael Maloof, Director,
Technology Security Operations, Defense Technology and
Security Administration, 10 February 1989.
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In order to ride the European de-nuclear/arms
reduction sentiment, it may be able to be focused into
strict technology controls, possibly even to the point of
amending the right to export in the West German
constitution. To have one without the other further
jeopardizes Western security.
E. PROPOSITION 5—A COUNTRY'S TECHNOLOGICAL PROFICIENCY AND
INDUSTRIAL BASE
A prerequisite to illegal technology diversion that
cannot be escaped is a country's technological proficiency
and industrial capability. If a nation intends to be
technologically proficient as all Western nations strive to
be, then they will continue to be targets. The bigger the
technical and industrial base the bigger the target. The
United States is presently the biggest target, but Japan is
continuously growing. The difference is the United States
has the best export controls of any country within COCOM,
Japan substantially less as previously discussed. This does
not discount countries who do not have any technical base,
since they can act as illegal diversion points.
F. PROPOSITION 6—THE AMOUNT OF TRADE THAT A SPECIFIC
COUNTRY DOES WITH THE SOVIET BLOC
Figure 1 shows the amount of trade that countries within
COCOM have with the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw
Pact. It seems that the countries that leak the most, do
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Figure 1. COCOM Trade with USSR/Warsaw Pact
128
divert an illegal shipment, disguised as a normal
transaction, than it is to generate an illegal transaction
from scratch. The Toshiba incident was an example of this
where both the milling machines and the computer controls
were disguised as legal exports. This is especially the
case where technology has progressed to the point where the
customs inspectors are incapable of recognizing a more
capable machine from a less capable machine. West Germany
and Japan are the two Western countries that trade the most
with the Soviets.
1. Recommendation
Try to encourage more trade with the West as well as
between the membership in general. It would be virtually
impossible to infringe on a specific country's sovereignty
by telling them who to trade with. But there is an effort
within the membership of COCOM to streamline the control
list, in an effort to achieve better standardization. This,
along with reduced controls for inter-membership trade,
hopefully will make it easier to conduct trade among the
partners and reduce trade with the Soviet bloc. This might
not come to pass because all Western countries previously
mentioned already do significantly more trade with the
United States than the Soviet bloc. Making it easier to
conduct trade among the membership won't mean a thing if a
country isn't going to observe the COCOM rules in the first
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place, especially if the Soviets are willing to pay high
prices for the commodity.
Looking at Figure 2, all countries previously
mentioned already do quite a bit more trade with the United
States than the Soviet bloc. It seems that these countries
would be more receptive to maintaining their American
market, than risking an illegal diversion to the Soviet
bloc. With the exception of West Germany, complying with
COCOM rules only affects a small portion of their entire
export market. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese went to
great lengths to calm the furor over the Toshiba incident
that had the potential to do significantly more damage to
their economy than the benefits of any sale to the Soviet
Union.
EXPORTS TO THE U.S. 1986 1987 (Millions of U.S.$)
FRANCE 8,832 10,415
ITALY 10,504 11,176
GREAT BRITAIN 15,312 18,195
WEST GERMANY 25,519 27,877
JAPAN 81,926 85,017
Figure 2 . Exports to the United States
G. PROPOSITION 7—THE SPECIFIC COUNTRY'S EXPORT PROCESS,
LAWS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST VIOLATORS
This weakness was previously identified in both Japan
and Germany. Italy also has never prosecuted anyone for an
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export violation. Compared to the United States there has
been almost no prosecutions in COCOM countries. Yet we do
the least amount of trade with the Soviet bloc. If the
United States can indict 192 cases since 1981, it is the
opinion of the author that the allies are either incompetent
or derelict in their responsibility of enforcing the laws
they agreed to enforce.
1. Recommendation
It seems that the only way U.S. export officials
have been able to get the allies to comply with COCOM
regulations is with public opinion. In both the Toshiba
incident and the Libyan Chemical Plant incident, neither
government took action until public opinion became so great
that action had to be taken. This does not help relations
between the two governments, but it is the only pressure
that has made them take any effort to bolster their trade
controls.
Sanctions against violators are the key. The only
way you will be able to stop the flow of strategic
technology to the Soviet Union is to increase the
consequences of doing business with them, and enforce it.
Sanctions aren't worth the paper they are printed on unless
they are strictly enforced. Some countries previously
mentioned have never employed an export sanction. The lack
of enforcement by any one member of COCOM directly affects
the control initiative of the whole membership in general.
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H. THE SPECIFIC COUNTRY'S PARTICIPATION IN COCOM AND THEIR
HISTORY OF EXPORT VIOLATIONS
The history of export violations was previously
addressed. Each country's participation in COCOM,
specifically cases submitted for COCOM consideration, shed
the most light on the inequity of the situation. If you
take the amount of trade each country does with the Soviet
bloc and compare it to the amount of export applications
submitted to COCOM for consideration, you will find that the
United States submits significantly more applications than
the nearest member country, yet does 10% of the amount of
trade.
Certain member countries, particularly the countries
that do the most trade with the Soviet bloc, just don't
bother to submit all transactions, thereby bypassing the
whole control mechanism. I asked Dr. Bryen, if I took the
amount of trade conducted between the Soviet Union and each
COCOM country, and compared it to the amount of applications
submitted would it tell me anything. "Damn right it will.
You'll find that most European countries are under
represented compared to the amount of trade they do. Only
two countries run anywhere close to reality, that's the U.S.
and Great Britain, the rest submit very few." 9 This further
validates the accusation that some members of COCOM
9. Interwith with Dr. Stephen D. Bryen, Former Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, and former Director, Defense
Technology and Security Administration, 7 February 1989.
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knowingly and blatantly violate COCOM restrictions for the
economic benefit of the sale. Apparently in their mind the
short term economic gain is worth jeopardizing Western
security.
1. Recommendation
It is clearly time to inform the public of the
situation at hand. In a democratic society public knowledge
and support of COCOM would provide the national effort
needed to ensure compliance. As a semi-secret organization,
COCOM is handcuffing itself and taking away the very
ingredient that would ensure enforcement. The organization
is only as good as its weakest link, and presently that is
not saying very much.
I. CONCLUSION
It is the opinion of the author, when taking into
account all propositions previously stated, that West
Germany and Japan present the greatest vulnerability when it
comes to diverting strategic technology. Although Italy
follows a close second, its reputation and technology base
isn't as large as Japan or West Germany. France, Great
Britain and the United States, although very technologically
proficient, have defense department personnel screening
export applications. Besides a defensive perspective, the
United States and Great Britain provide adequate personnel
and funding to back up their export procedures. These two
countries also vigorously prosecute export violators,
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something Japan has done just once, and West Germany has
never done.
Although both West Germany and Japan are taking
initiatives to improve their export procedures, one thing
must be remembered. In both the Toshiba incident and the
Libyan Chemical Plant incident, it was then and it is now
against the laws of their respective country's to export
those specific technologies without COCOM approval. No
amount of effort within the membership to streamline the
procedure or narrow the commodity control list would have
prevented those transactions. Those companies willfully
violated their own country's law, as wells as COCOM
regulations. Each incident involved fraud, inadequate means
of detection and the inability to prosecute the responsible
parties. Unless both West Germany and Japan go to the heart
of the problem, instead of just treating the symptom,
technology will continue to leak to the Soviet bloc.
Both legal and illegal sales need more attention in the
West, but first and foremost are the illegal exports, or the
transaction disguised as a legal sale. If the Soviets
obtain a technology legally, they get factory
representation, service and even warranties, such as they
did with the Toshiba incident. If they steal it they have
to figure out how to make it work, and they can't call a
salesman to complain. These legal, or pseudo-legal sales
are doing the most damage and need the most immediate
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attention. COCOM is the key, and West Germany and Japan are
the places to start.
When trying to convince non-receptive bodies such as the
Department of Commerce or some members of COCOM of the need
for tighter security controls on exports, examples such as
the ones previously discussed seem so obvious considering
the assets of Western intelligence agencies. The emphasis
the Soviet Union puts on Western technology is too great to
overlook. The successes of the Soviet bloc have been
astounding, and if overlooked, possibly fatal for the
Western alliance. It is not to say that the needs of the
Department of Defense should far outweigh those of the
Department of Commerce, but that a sufficient compromise
position has to be drawn in order to curtail such incidents
in the future. This applies not only in the United States,
but within the international market place as well. It is
within COCOM, as well as within NATO, that we provide a
united front against this Soviet effort, and it is only with
a united effort that we can win a technology war.
Mr. Maloof made it clear to me that despite the many
deficiencies, COCOM was still the only game in town for
multilaterally controlling technology. "Yes there have been
alot of disappointments, but it seems to be working." Mr.
Bryen told me that we would be in much worse shape without
the organization. "The allies although reluctant, do
respond to our demands." Somehow, as a Naval officer, I
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didn't find the words too comforting. I may be one of the
officers that have to contend with the quieter, harder to
detect Soviet submarines in order to resupply the ally that
gave them this increased capability. It is the opinion of
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